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Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971)
The United States Supreme Court has recognized three valid
exceptions to the general rule that there can be no search or seizure
without a valid search warrant. First, a warrantless search and
seizure may be made where incident to a valid arrest;' however,
such a search must be reasonable and cannot be general or ex-
ploratory in nature.2 In Chimel v. California the Supreme Court
limited such searches to "the arrestee's person and the area 'within
his immediate control'."3  The second exception to search warrant
requirements arises where the search is of a vehicle. This excep-
tion was first stated in Carroll v. United States,4 where the
court indicated that a warrantless search of a vehicle was proper
only in situations "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant."5
In Chambers v. Maroney the Supreme Court indicated it is imprac-
ticable to obtain a search warrant "where there is probable cause
to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is movable,
the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be
found again if a warrant must be obtained."'6 Finally, evidence
1. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
2. Id. at 65 "The mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that the
people shall be secure against unreasonable searches.... ".(emphasis by
the Court).
3. 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
4. 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
5. Id. at 153.
6. 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
obtained in a warrantless search is admissible if the object comes
into plain view of the police as a result of exigent circumstances
such as: police discovery of an incriminating object found
through pure inadvertence;7 discovery of evidence by the police
while in "'hot pursuit' of a fleeing suspect";8 police discovery of
objects not specified by the search warrant while performing a
valid search;9 or when the police conduct a properly limited search
incident to arrest and discover objects which are in plain view but
outside this restricted area. 10 All of these warrantless search ex-
ceptions are considered by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Coolidge v. New Hampshire."' In rendering its opinion,
the Court attempted to clarify exactly what situations fall within
the bounds of each of these three exceptions.
On January 21, 1964, Pamela Mason was found murdered. In
the ensuing investigation it was discovered that Edward Cool-
idge, petitioner, had been away from home on the night of the girl's
disappearance. Coolidge was questioned and sufficient evidence
was acquired to permit the issuance of search warrants and an ar-
rest warrant. The warrants were issued by the Attorney General
of New Hampshire who was also in charge of the investigation.
12
The police arrested Coolidge, and two and one-half hours later his
cars were towed to the police station. An automobile meeting the
description of one of the vehicles impounded by the police had been
seen by two witnesses on the evening of Pamela Mason's death,
parked where the body was later found. The identified auto
was searched and vacuum sweepings were taken two days after
seizure and on two subsequent occasions a year later.'3  These
vacuum sweepings were entered in evidence against Coolidge. Based
largely on that evidence the trial court found Coolidge guilty as
charged. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court, but on appeal to the United States Supreme Court the deci-
sion was reversed.
7. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
8. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2037 (1971). See
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
9. Cf. Stanley v. George, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); United States v. Lef-
kowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 344 (1931); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
10. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
11. 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971).
12. Id. at 2028. The Attorney General of New Hampshire issued
the warrants while acting in the capacity of a justice of the peace. Under
New Hampshire law, since repealed in 1969, any justice of the peace could
issue a search warrant.
13. Id. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), represents the
Supreme Court position that a vehicle properly seized may justifiably be
searched at the police station at a later time. However, the majority in
Coolidge held the Chambers decision inapplicable because there was no




The first issue considered by the Supreme Court was whether
the evidence seized from the automobiles was obtained under a
valid search warrant. A warrant had been issued by the Attorney
General of New Hampshire who also led the investigation. The
majority in Coolidge found the warrants invalid since "not issued
by a neutral and detached magistrate. 1 4 Having found the search
warrant invalid, the Court went on to consider whether the evidence
might be admissible under one of the three exceptions where war-
rantless searches are permissible. The Supreme Court examined
each exception to the general rule requiring a warrant and found
each inapplicable to this case. In the course of this examination
the Court attempted to clarify exactly what situations fall within
each of the three exceptions.' 5
The first warrantless search exception considered was that of
a search incident to a valid arrest. Such a search must be reason-
able', as well as incident to a valid arrest. Since there was no
no contention that the arrest in Coolidge was invalid, the sole con-
sideration was the reasonableness of the search. In United States
v. Rabinowitz"7 the Court declared that reasonableness is not based
upon the practicability of obtaining a search warrant. Rather, it
is to be determined solely upon whether or not the search itself is
"reasonable,"1 s and "a reasonable search is not to be determined by
any fixed formula."' 9 In Rabinowitz a search was made of the de-
fendant's desk, safe and file cabinets in the office where the defend-
14. 91 S. Ct. at 2029. Since the Attorney General of New Hampshire
was in charge of the investigation the Supreme Court held:
[W]ithout disrespect to the state law enforcement agent here in-
volved, the whole point of the basic rule so well expressed by
Mr. Justice Jackson is that prosecutors and policemen simply can-
not be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to
their own investigations ...
Id. In strong dissent Mr. Justice Black stated: "The state attorney gen-
eral was not barred by the Fourth Amendment or any other constitu-
tional provision from issuing the warrant." Id. at 2055. It is not the
function of a magistrate "to sit as a judge and weigh the evidence and
practically determine guilt or innocence before issuing a warrant." Id.
Also, contended Mr. Justice Black, even if the issuance was improper it
was "harmless error" since "[t]here was no possibility of prejudice because
there was no room for discretion. . . ." Id.
15. State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969).
16. See note 2 supra.
17. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
18. Id. at 65.
19. 339 U.S. at 63. In Rabinowitz the Supreme Court held the search
was reasonable since:
(1) the search and seizure were incident to a valid arrest;
(2) the place of the search was a business room to which the
public, including the officers, was invited; (3) the room was
small and under the complete and immediate control of respon-
dent; (4) the search did not extend beyond the room used for
unlawful purposes; (5) the possession of the forged and altered
ant was arrested. The Rabinowitz decision held that such a search
was reasonable since the area searched was under the defendant's
complete control. In Stoner v. California20 the Supreme Court
clarified the Rabinowitz decision by stating that searches inci-
dent to arrest must be contemporaneous with the arrest in addition
to being confined to the immediate vicinity of that arrest.
2 1
In Chimel v. California,22 decided after the New Hampshire
Supreme Court decision in Coolidge, the United States Supreme
Court set forth specific criteria which must be met for a valid war-
rantless search incident to arrest. The defendant in Chimel was
arrested and his entire house was contemporaneously searched.
Ruling that the evidence there obtained was inadmissible, the court
limited such searches as follows:
There is ample justification therefore, for a search of the
arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate con-
trol"--construing that phrase to mean the area from which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evi-
dence.20
In Chimel, the search was held improper since, although con-
temporaneous with arrest, its scope was not sufficiently restricted.
The Supreme Court in Chimel determined that a warrantless search
incident to valid arrest is proper solely for the protection of the ar-
resting officer and to prevent destruction of evidence by the
arrestee. Therefore, such searches must be appropriately restricted
in scope and contemporaneous with arrest.
The Coolidge Court followed the determination in Chimel and
held the search of the automobile invalid since it was neither con-
temporaneous with the arrest nor properly limited in scope.2 4 The
auto in Coolidge was not within the immediate control of Cool-
idge since it was outside the house in which he was arrested.
Also, the search was not performed contemporaneously with the
arrest since no search was made until after the auto had been
towed to the police station.
Dissenting opinions in Coolidge by Justices Black and White 25
to the finding of the majority on this issue are based essentially
on Harris v. United States.26 In this case, the defendants were ar-
stamps was a crime, just as it is a crime to possess burglars' tools,
lottery tickets or counterfeit money.
Id. at 64.
20. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
21. Id. at 486.
22. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Since the Chimel case was decided after the
New Hampshire Supreme Court decided the question of admissibility
of evidence in the Coolidge case, the Chimel finding on this question could
not be considered by the Coolidge court. However, the Chimel finding
represents the most current case law on search incident to a valid arrest.
23. Id. at 763.
24. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2033 (1971).
25. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2056 (dissenting
opinion, Black, J.), 2062 (dissenting opinion, White, J.).
26. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
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rested by the police who had valid arrest warrants charging viola-
tions of the mail fraud statutes. A search of the premises with-
out a search warrant disclosed several draft cards which were
the property of the United States. In Harris, a five-hour search of
the entire apartment of the arrestee following a valid arrest was
declared reasonable. It was emphasized in Harris however that
the size of the object sought and the degree of control of the
arrestee will dictate the scope of the search.27 Furthermore, sub-
sequent Supreme Court decisions have moved in the direction of lim-
iting searches incident to arrest.
28
The second premise upon which the state attempted to validate
the warrantless search was that it was based on probable cause
and that since the search was of a vehicle, the warrantless search
exception initially stated in Carroll v. United States29 was ap-
plicable. In Carroll the defendant's auto was stopped by govern-
ment agents and searched for possible violation of the Prohibition
Act. The search was held valid since the officers had probable
cause to believe the act was being violated. The majority in Cool-
idge stated that the motor vehicle exception simply did not apply
since "by no possible stretch of the legal imagination can this be
made into a case where 'it is not practicable to secure a war-
rant'." 0 The vehicle was not in motion nor was it possible for the
defendant to move the auto. Further, a proper search warrant
could have been acquired prior to the arrest since the police
were aware of a need to search the vehicle. As stated in the ma-
jority opinion: "The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose
"~31presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears ... .
In dissent, Mr. Justice White contended that the majority was
limiting the movable vehicle exception in a manner not indicated
by the Supreme Court in its prior applications of that exception.
32
27. Id.
28. See notes 19, 21, 25 and accompanying text supra.
29. 267 U.S. 132 (1924). Carroll distinguishes searches of vehicles as
follows:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically
since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a neces-
sary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may
be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or auto-
mobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Id. at 153.
30. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2036 (1971).
31. Id. at 2035.
32. Id. at 2067.
Mr. Justice White argued that in the entire line of cases from Car-
roll to Chambers "each ... approved the search of a vehicle that
was no longer moving and, with the occupants in custody, no more
likely to move than the unattended but movable vehicle parked
on the street or in the driveway of a person's house." 3 He con-
tended that the vehicle in both situations could be as easily moved
by a third party
4
In defense of its seeming contraction of the Carroll exception,
the majority argued that the Carroll exception arose because of
the mobility of vehicles. Where such mobility does not exist, the
Court will not apply the exception. 35 In Coolidge the auto was
parked and a warrant could easily have been obtained with little
possibility that someone would move the evidence. The majority
stated that to extend Carroll to such an immobile and unoccupied
car would make Carroll equally applicable to the warrantless
search of a box or suitcase.36
The final exception to the requirement for a search warrant
is the so-called "plain-view" exception, which is applicable in sev-
eral circumstances. If the police have a valid search warrant to
search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the
search come across other articles of an incriminating character,
the doctrine applies and the unspecified objects will be admissible
evidence.37 Where police inadvertently come across evidence while
in "'hot pursuit' of a fleeing suspect," the doctrine also applies.
3 8
Finally, where an object comes into view during a search incident
to arrest which is appropriately limited in scope under existing law,
the plain-view doctrine applies and the object may properly be
seized. 39
All these instances, according to the majority, have two things
in common: a justified intrusion by the officer based on exigent cir-
33. Id.
34. Also dissenting on this issue, Mr. Justice Black argued that the
Supreme Court in Chambers held that the immobility of the automobile
was irrelevant to the applicability of the doctrine of valid warrantless
searches of vehicles. He contended that since Chambers held that a war-
rantless search of a vehicle at the police station is proper if the seizure of
the auto was valid, the immobility of the vehicle cannot be a factor in
determining probable cause to search. 91 S. Ct. at 2057 (dissenting opin-
ion, Black, J.).
35. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2035-36 (1971).
36. Id. at 2045. Also, in United States v. Payne, 429 F.2d 169 (9th
Cir. 1970) the court refused to permit an extension of Carroll where there
was little chance that the vehicle would be moved. In Payne police saw a
vehicle parked in a campsite and had reason to believe there were illegal
drugs therein. However, one couple, who owned the car, was at another
campsite and the remaining couple had prepared for bed. The court held
the search invalid since there was ample time to obtain a search warrant
and this fact was known to the police.
37. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
38. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
39. See note 10 supra.
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cumstances, and inadvertence in discovery. 4 0 The justified intru-
sion may be based upon a valid arrest. Under these circumstances
the plain-view doctrine appears to be contra to the Chimel hold-
ing on searches incident to valid arrest discussed previously.4 1
However, the Court made it clear in Coolidge v. New Hampshire
that "the plain-view doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something in-
criminating at last emerges. '42 An intrusion without a search
warrant is never justified unless exigent circumstances exist. In
Trupiano v. United States43 federal agents had information that
the defendant was operating an illegal distillery. However, these
agents obtained neither arrest nor search warrants although
time permitted such acquisition. The arrest was held valid since
the unlawful act of operating the illegal distillery was observed
by the agents. The search, however, was declared invalid and
the officers were not allowed to testify even though during the
arrest the officers were in plain-view of the still. The plain-view
doctrine did not apply because exigent circumstances did not exist
since the officers easily could have obtained a search warrant
but had not.
4 4
In addition to exigent circumstances there must be inadver-
tence in discovery. The majority stated in Coolidge: "where the
discovery is anticipated, [and] where the police know in advance
the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is
altogether different."45 The discovery and seizure of the automo-
bile in Coolidge were not inadvertent. The police were aware of
the location of the car and fully intended to seize it when they
40. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2039 (1971). The
plain-view exception to the fourth amendment is defended as constitu-
tional by the majority as follows. The fourth amendment protects the
people against unreasonable searches. A valid search warrant permits a
constitutional search since such warrant is issued only upon a showing of
probable cause and a proper limitation of the scope of search. Under the
plain-view doctrine the initial intrusion is validated either by a search
warrant or exigent circumstances such as hot pursuit or search incident
to arrest, in which cases there is probable cause to search. The second
warrant requirement, a limited area in which to search, is met in the
plain-view doctrine since the area of search under this doctrine is limited
to those objects brought into plain view as a result of the initial valid
intrusion.
41. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
42. 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038 (1971); cf. Stanley v. George, 394 U.S. 557
(1969).
43. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
44. Trupiano v. United States as cited in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2039 (1971).
45. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2040 (1971).
went to the house to arrest Coolidge. It should be indicated that
the plain-view doctrine was of doubtful applicability in Coolidge
since, although the car was in plain view, the evidence obtained
from the car through vacuum sweepings obviously was not in
plain view. This must have been a factor in the Court's finding
that the plain-view exception was inapplicable in Coolidge. The
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black on this issue ignores this con-
sideration.
Mr. Justice Black contended that the plain-view doctrine has
never required inadvertence for its proper applicability.46 Mr. Jus-
tice Black relied on the following cases to substantiate this conclu-
sion. In Ker v. California 7 police observed the defendant take
part in an illegal marijuana transaction, then went to his apartment,
arrested him and confiscated marijuana in plain view in an adjoin-
ing room. The Supreme Court upheld the admission of this evi-
dence since it was discovered in plain view incident to a lawful ar-
rest. It would be difficult to contend that the marijuana was found
inadvertently. Also, in Marron v. United States4 the discovery of
business records in plain view at the business establishment was
hardly inadvertent. In Warden v. Hayden,49 while in "hot pur-
suit" of an armed robber, police searched his home and found a
shotgun and pistol, ammunition and clothes similar to those seen
on the robber by a witness. It does not appear that these discov-
eries were inadvertent.
Mr. Justice White also criticized the majority for adding the re-
quirement of inadvertence in discovery of evidence to the applica-
tion of the plain-view exception since this requirement furthers
no fourth amendment ends. He argued that the doctrine is pres-
ently applicable only in specifically defined instances of exigent cir-
cumstances. The fourth amendment prevents only unreasonable
searches, and plain-view prior to Coolidge was limited to situations
where the search was reasonable. Mr. Justice White argued that
the public is not being further protected against unreasonable
searches by this additional plain-view requirement of inadver-
tence.5 0
A clarification of the requirements of a valid warrantless
search was a primary consideration of the majority in Coolidge v.
46. Id. at 2057-60 (dissenting opinion, Black, J.).
47. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
48. 275 U.S. 192 (1927). In this case prohibition agents searched the
premises of the defendant for intoxicating liquor illegally possessed.
The agents had a valid search warrant, and in the course of the search
discovered and seized business records in plain view. Such seizure was
declared valid in spite of the fact that this discovery was hardly inad-
vertent since business records are commonly maintained in business es-
tablishments.
49. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
50. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2063 (1971) (dissent-
ing opinion, White, J.).
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New Hampshire. Such a warrantless search is permissible where
incident to a valid arrest only where the search is contemporaneous
with the arrest and is limited in scope to the arrestee's person and
the area within his immediate control.5 1 Coolidge represents a lim-
itation on the warrantless-search exception since in prior cases
the area within the arrestee's control had been more broadly con-
strued. Warrantless search incident to arrest applies now only
where the search is limited to the area necessary to protect the
arresting officer. The second warrantless search exception, that
of the movable vehicle, has been limited by Coolidge to instances
where the vehicle is seized while occupied and on the open road.52
Finally, the plain-view doctrine 53 is now applicable only to situa-
tions in which the evidence is discovered through inadvertence. 54
ROBERT L. WELDON
51. See notes 22, 23 and accompanying text supra.
52. See notes 30, 31 and accompanying text supra.
53. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
54. Not considered in this case note were the constitutional applica-
tions underlying the finding by the majority that the search of the auto-
mobile was unreasonable. In essence, the majority reasoned that the
fourth amendment requires a search warrant unless some exigent circum-
stance is present which would meet the fourth amendment requirement
that the warrantless search be reasonable. Such a necessary search will
be reasonable only to the extent it was required by those circumstances.
Thus, as the majority pointed out in Chimel v. California, a search inci-
dent to valid arrest is permissible only to the extent necessary to protect
the officers involved. The majority found no such circumstance in Cool-
idge. "Since the police knew of the presence of the automobile and
planned all along to seize it, there was no 'exigent circumstance' to justify
their failure to obtain a warrant." 91 S. Ct. at 2044.
CONSUMER PROTECTION-PUBLIC CLASS ACTIONS
-NEW HOPE FOR DEFRAUDED CONSUMERS
Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 460 (1971).
The central problem of consumer fraud actions is the "failure
of the law to provide a meaningful compensatory damages rem-
edy."1  Individual actions have not been employed effectively
because of the excessive costs of litigation2 and because of the con-
sumer's ignorance of his legal rights.3 Private class actions have
yet to become a viable means of securing restitution for the de-
frauded, primarily because of the difficulty in satisfying the com-
mon procedural prerequisites for the action.4 In order to bring a
class action suit, the plaintiffs must constitute an ascertainable
class bound by common interests. The group must be so large
that it is impractical to join the parties, and the named plaintiffs
must adequately represent the unnamed members of the class.5
The courts have strictly applied these procedural requirements, of-
ten to deny the use of the class action to the consumer.6 An ad-
1. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Con-
sumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U. L. Rsv. 559, 567 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Rice].
2. Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into
Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 409 (1966).
The Philadelphia Bar Association has established minimum legal fees of
forty dollars per hour for general office consultation and for preparing a
brief, fifty dollars an hour for settlement conferences and one hundred
and seventy-five dollars per half day in court. PHILADELPHIA BAR AsSOCIA-
TION, MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULE, at 12, 15, 27 (1971). At a recent hearing
in the state of New York it was reported that the middle income wage
earner is being deprived of adequate legal representation. Because he
earns too much money to qualify for free legal aid and too little to afford
private legal fees, the citizen who earns between six and fifteen thousand
dollars a year is often forced to appear in court without counsel or forego
legal action. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1971, at 27, col. 3, 4 (city ed.).
3. D. CAPLOWITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 175 (1967).
4. See Rice at 583.
5. See generally, Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II Con-
siderations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L. Rn'. 407, 497-504 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Hall v. Coburn Corporation of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396,
259 N.E. 2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970). A consumer class action was dis-
missed on the grounds that the class was not united in interest and that
the maintenance of the suit would deprive other class members of other
actions they would prefer to bring against the defendants. But see, Con-
tract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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ditional consideration is that, with limited exception, 7 the courts
have not accepted damages as a remedy for unnamed members
in a class action.8 The private consumer class action has un-
fortunately been primarily limited to enjoining fraudulent sales
practices 9 and obtaining money damages for named parties.10
Some state legislatures have recognized that public action is
necessary to protect the consumer. Common legislative responses
include the creation of consumer protection agencies," and
statutes authorizing the state attorney general to enjoin fradulent
sales tactics. 12 A growing minority of states have extended the
power of the attorney general, authorizing him to secure restitu-
tion for a defrauded class of consumers. 13 This case note is con-
cerned with the first appellate interpretation of the standing of the
state attorney general, under the latter statutes, to bring an action
for restitution on behalf of a class of defrauded buyers. It is
the contention of this note that the public class action offers a
powerful response to the problem of securing restitution for de-
frauded consumers.
In Kugler v. Romain,14 the defendant owned Educational Serv-
ice Company which conducted a door-to-door sales solicitation busi-
ness. The product was a fifteen volume package called "A Com-
plete Ten Year Educational Program." 5 Defendant Romain oper-
7. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732,
63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
8. See, e.g., Kovarseky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Company, 279 N.Y.
304, 18 N.E.2d 287, aff'd, 253 App. Div. 635, 3 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1938).
See generally, Starrs at 419-20.
9. See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
motion to amend dismissed, 314 F. Supp. 1112 (E.D. Pa. 1970) prob. juris
noted, 91 S. Ct. 1220, 28 L. Ed. 524 (1971).
10. See, Starrs, The Consumer Class Action--Part II Considerations
of Procedure, 49 B.U.L. REv. 407, 420 (1969).
11. See generally, Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived
Consumers Into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
395, 430-36 (1966).
12. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-115(d) (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121 § 267 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 93A §§ 2, 4 (Supp. 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.15, 16, 325. 79, 907
(Supp. 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-.02 (Supp. 1965); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 56:8-1,-2 (1960); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(12) (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
73, §§ 201-1,-9 (Supp. 1968).
13. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 § 267 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A § 9 (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-8
(1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5T-15-.07 (Supp. 1965).
14. 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971).
15. The package included: QUESTONS CHILDREN ASK (1 vol.), CHILD
HorazoNs (4 vols.), NEw ACHIEVEMENT LIBmAR (5 vols.), HIGH SCHOOL
SUBJECTS SELF-TAUGHT (4 vols.), SCIENCE LIBRARY (1 vol.), two 45 r.p.m.
ated primarily in large cities where his sales personnel were able
to "consciously direct their solicitations toward minority group
consumers"'16 who were "particularly prone to commercial over-
reaching."'71 The sales presentation utilized by the defendant's em-
ployees was "high pressure . . . geared to showing the virtues of
education as a medium for financial and social advancement.'
Is
Among the specific misrepresentations were statements that the
books were being sold under a federal grant or for various lo-
cal school systems, and that the package would lead to a high
school equivalency diploma.19 In addition, there was evidence of
unscrupulous distortion of the contractual terms in order to make
the sale.
20
Total price for the package was $279.95, payable in twenty-
four monthly installments of $11.50. 21 The trial court found that
the wholesale value of the materials was thirty-five to forty dol-
lars.22 Uncontradicted evidence established the maximum retail
price at one hundred and ten dollars.' 3 In addition to the exorbi-
tant price, the state offered uncontroverted evidence that the books
were "useless" for the purpose for which they were represented.
The package as a whole served "no purpose in improving the intel-
lectual level of [the] children, arousing their intellectual curiosity
and compensating for the deficient intellectual climate in which
they are being raised."24  The trial court held that the defend-
ant's deceptive sales practices violated the Consumer Fraud Act.25
Defendant Romain was fined26 and enjoined from engaging in
the fraudulent practices specified in the act.27 The contracts of
French and Spanish records, flashcards and a bonus volume of Black his-
tory, a Bible or an atlas.
16. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640, 643 (1971).
17. Brief for the Plaintiff at 3, Kugler v. Romain, 110 N.J. Super. 470,
266 A.2d 144 (1970).
18. Id.
19. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640, 645.
20. Id.
21. Total payments were $276.00.
22. Kugler v. Romain, 110 N.J. Super. 470, 266 A.2d 144, 148 (1970).
23. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640, 644 (1971).
24. Id.
25. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 to 8-12 (1960), 56:8-1 to 8-14 (Supp.
1967).
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-14 (Supp. 1967) provides a $50-100 fine
for each violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. The total amount of the
fines in Kugier was $2,400. During its operation in New Jersey, Educa-
tional Services Co. collected as much as $193,563 on the contracts in one
year. Brief for the Appellant at 4, Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279
A.2d 640 (1971).
27. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (1960) provides that
The act, use or employment by a person of and deception, fraud,
false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing
concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale
... of any merchandise or with the subsequent performance of
such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person in fact has




eight named members of the class of plaintiffs were rescinded
and restitution ordered. All other named parties were denied re-
lief.
28
Before discussing the supreme court holding, an analysis of
the lower court decision is appropriate. At trial the attorney gen-
eral contended that an exorbitant price per se constituted fraud
within the meaning of the Consumer Fraud Act. The purpose of
this argument was twofold: to obtain the use of an established
measure of unconscionability in the decisional law as a test of
consumer fraud,2 9 and to establish the compatability of the con-
cepts of unconscionability and fraud. In rejecting this proposition
the lower court held that in addition to excessive price, proof of
deceptive practices must be shown to constitute fraud.30 The
state had also contended that an alternate statutory basis for the
action was Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302. 3 1 This argu-
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56: 808. (1960) provides, in part, that
Whenever it shall appear to the Attorney General that a person
has engaged in or is about to engage in any practice declared to
be unlawful by this act, he may seek and obtain in any action in
the Superior Court an injunction prohibiting such person from
continuing such practices or engaging therein or doing any acts in
furtherance thereof. . . . The court may make such orders as may
be necessary to restore to any person in interest any moneys or
property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by
means of any practice herein declared to be unlawful.
28. There were thirty-seven named parties in the attorney general's
class action complaint. At the conclusion of the trial the state withdrew
the restitutionary claims of thirteen named plaintiffs who did not testify
at the trial. The lower court held that proof of fraud was necessary to
recover damages under the Consumer Fraud Act and that the attorney
general had proven fraud only in the cases of the witnesses who had testi-
fied during the trial. Twenty-four named plaintiffs did testify but only
eight were granted restitution for their losses. The remaining sixteen
parties were denied relief on the grounds that they had either settled with
the defendant through the services of a legal aid attorney or had suffered
no loss. Kugler v. Romain, 110 N.J. Super. 470, 266 A.2d 144, 151 (1970).
The claims for restitution for unnamed parties defrauded by the respon-
dent were abandoned prior to the trial. Brief for the Plaintiff at 27, Kugler
v. Romain, 110 N.J. Super. 470, 266 A.2d 144, 151 (1970).
29. See American Home Improvement v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201
A.2d 886 (1964); Toker v. Pearl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 244 (1970);
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 298, N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969); State by
Lefkowitz v. I.T.M. Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966). The is-
sue in Pennsylvania has yet to be resolved.
30. Kugler v. Romain, 110 N.J. Super. 470, 266 A.2d 144, 149 (1970).
31. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, codified in New Jersey as
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-302(1) (1961), provides that
If the court as a matter of law finds that the contract or any
clause in the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
ment was summarily rejected on the basis that "unconscionability
• . . is strictly a matter of private concern and cannot be asserted
by the Attorney General.
'3 2
The attorney general's strategy was plain. In submitting the
Consumer Fraud Act to the courts for its first judicial interpreta-
tion the state was determined to secure a broad reading. This
was to be achieved by identifying the public policy concept of un-
conscionability with the meaning of consumer fraud in its statu-
tory context.83 Looking beyond the instant factual circumstances,
the attorney general sought to establish policy guidelines to com-
bat other incidents of "price gouging," as where an exorbitant
price is charged without evidence of fraud. The decision of the
trial court severely limited the effectiveness of the Consumer
Fraud Act. On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, two issues
were paramount: whether the concept of unconscionability was
to be equated with fraud for the purposes of the Consumer Fraud
Act; and, whether the attorney general had the authority under
the act to secure restitution for all consumers victimized by the
defendant's unconscionable practices.3
4
The New Jersey Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Francis, 5 held that "in consumer goods transactions . . . uncon-
scionability must be equated with the concepts of deception,
fraud, false pretense, misrepresentation . . . which are stamped
unlawful under the [Consumer Fraud Act]."36 The court's ration-
ale for this conclusion is illustrative of the direct, pragmatic
reasoning which distinguishes the decision. Considerations of pub-
lic policy, equity, and the difficulties of commercially naive con-
sumers are evident throughout Mr. Justice Francis' opinion. The
court analogized the purpose of the Consumer Fraud Act and sec-
32. Kugler v. Romain, 110 N.J. Super. 470, 266 A.2d 144, 150 (1970).
Specific authority for the attorney general's argument is slim. Under
similar facts and statutory authorization similar to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:
2-2 (1960), Lefkowitz v. I.T.M. Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321
(1966), implied in dicta that section 2-302 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE was sufficient basis for an injunction.
33. See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d
264 (1969). "[T]he law is beginning to fight back against those who once
took advantage of the poor and illiterate without risk of exposure or inter-
ference.... ." "[S]ection 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code enacts
the moral sense of community into the law of commercial transactions."
Id. at 191, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
34. The claims for restitution for all named and unnamed parties
were reinstated in the appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court. Kugler
v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640, 642 (1971).
35. Mr. Justice Francis' jurisprudence was recently the subject of
an extensive analysis in the Justice John J. Francis Symposium, 24 RUT.
L. REV. 423-519 (1970). The author of the majority opinions in Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 405 (1960), Unico v.
Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Ellsworth Dobbs Inc. v. Johnson,
50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967), Mr. Justice Francis has expressed a
leading consumer rights philosophy.
36. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640, 652 (1971).
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tion 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code as the creating of eth-
ical business standards.37 The need for commercial ethics "is most
acute when the professional seller is seeking the trade of those
most subject to exploitation-the uneducated, the inexperienced
and the people of low income. '38 It was further determined that
in enacting the Consumer Fraud Act, the legislature "obviously de-
signed to establish a broad business ethic to be interpret[ed] ...
liberally so as to effectuate the public purpose. '39 The purpose of
the Consumer Fraud Act, the court held, was to "broaden the scope
of responsibility for unfair business practices . . . [and] the law-
makers [have] accepted the premise that the market bargaining
process does not protect ordinary consumers .... ,,40 Both fraud
and unconscionability are material deviations from the criteria of
good faith, honesty in fact and fair dealing. Therefore, the
court concluded, fraud and unconscionability are synonomous in
the context of the Consumer Fraud Act.
41
In resolving the issue of the attorney general's authority to
initiate a class action under the Consumer Fraud Act, Mr. Justice
Francis again relied upon legislative intent. The fundamental
premise of the Act is that private remedies do not adequately
protect the interests of consumers. 42 The attorney general, there-
fore, is empowered to restrain fraudulent sales practices and to
restore to the defrauded parties money and property paid under
such contracts. The Consumer Fraud Act was the lawmaker's re-
sponse to the "need to find a simple, inexpensive solution which
will accomplish the greatest possible good for the consumers who
have common problems and complaints vis-a-vis the seller."43 Leg-
islative emphasis is upon solving similar problems of a great num-
ber of people as expediently as possible, and the class action device
specifically responds to these demands. The court held that the
attorney general had "the authority to bring action in the public
interest under [the Consumer Fraud Act] either on behalf of specifi-
cally named buyers. . . or in the nature of a class action on behalf
of all similarly situated buyers.
'44
The court affirmed the attorney general's contention that an
unreasonably high sales price for a disproportionate value was
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id., 279 A.2d at 651.
40. Id., 279 A.2d at 652.
41. Id.
42. Id., 279 A.2d at 649.
43. Id.
44. Id.
unconscionable and fraudulent within the meaning of the Con-
sumer Fraud Act.45 The price-retail value disparity in Kugler v.
Romain was approximately two and one-half to one, which the
court found unconscionable. The defendant's sales contract was de-
clared "invalid as to all consumers who executed it [and] the At-
torney General was entitled to a judgment so holding as to the
entire class of persons. . . ."4 The trial court's decision was ac-
cordingly modified and remanded with orders to effect "the re-
storative relief required by the Consumer Fraud Act."
47
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that it was "unneces-
sary to decide whether the Attorney General could maintain a
class action for all similarly affected customers based solely upon
violation of section 2-302 . . . of the Uniform Commercial Code.
48
Mr. Justice Francis was primarily interested in interpreting and
applying the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, and was able to grant
the relief sought by the plaintiff under the Act. In addition,
the court responded to the substance of the attorney general's con-
tention that 2-302 was applicable by including unconscionability
within the statutory meaning of fraud.49 Little precedent supports
the proposition that the attorney general can bring a class action
under section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code,5 0 and the
court could see no compelling reason to resolve the issue in New
Jersey. Nonetheless, Mr. Justice Francis carefully refused to fore-
close the issue. Whether section 2-302 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code is valid authority for an action brought by a state at-
torney general on behalf of defrauded consumers is of special rele-
vance to states like Pennsylvania where there is no statute provid-
ing for restitution through state action.
Inexplicably, the defendant in Kugler v. Romain declined to
challenge the adequacy of the attorney general's class action com-
plaint. In the trial court the unnamed plaintiffs were dropped from
the complaint, but in the subsequent appeal the unnamed mem-
bers were reinstated. 51 New Jersey decisional law provided the ba-
sis for plausible challenges to the state's complaint. The defendant
could have contended that the action was a "spurious class ac-
tion" 52 whereby the court's judgment would be binding only
45. Id., 279 A.2d at 654. See Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability
Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 964-67 (1969) for a discussion of price-
value disparity. Professor Spanogle has found that a disparity greater
than two to one generally results in a finding of unconscionability.
46. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 64a, 654 (1971).
47. Id.
48. Id., 279 A.2d at 652.
49. Id.
50. See note 32 supra.
51. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640, 642 (1971).
52. See 3A J. Moore, Federal Practice ff 23.10 [3], 3442-55 (2d ed. 1970).
The spurious class suit is a permissive joinder device. The pres-
ence of numerous persons interested in a common question of law
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upon the named parties.53 A less compelling argument available
to the defendant was that there was not the requisite community
of interest, because the action was based upon many separate
and different transactions.5 4  Despite the fact that the suffi-
ciency of the complaint was not in dispute, the court, anticipating
further controversies, carefully discussed the issue. The court
did not utilize New Jersey common law, but chose to apply the most
recent class action statement of the California courts given in Vas-
quez v. The Superior Court of San Joaquin County.55 In Vas-
quez, under facts similar 6 to Kugler, the court rejected the con-
tention that a class action could not be maintained because
each consumer made a separate contract at a different time.
57 It
was held that the community of interest requirement is fulfilled
if the plaintiffs are able to prove that the defendant's employees
used substantially similar misrepresentations. 58  The Vasquez
holding has precedent in New Jersey law,5 9 but the court preferred
the California decision for two reasons: first, because of the factual
similarity between Vasquez and Kugler;6" and more significantly,
or fact warrants its use. . . . The character of the right sought to
be enforced for or against the class if . . . "several, and there is a
common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and
common relief is sought."
Id. at 3442.
53. See, e.g., United Stations of New Jersey (U.S.) v. Getty Oil Co.,
102 N.J. Super. 459, 246 A.2d 150, 161 (1968), aff'd, 54 N.J. 150, 253 A.2d
813 (1969).
54. See, e.g., Terrell v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 80 N.J. 51, 192
A.2d 850 (1963). But see Branch v. White, 99 N.J. Super. 295, 239 A.2d
668 (1968).
55. 4 Cal. App. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
56. Id. In Vasquez, the defendant operated a house-to-house sales
solicitation business. The product was a freezer with a seven-month
food supply. Defendant's salesmen allegedly made false representations
that the freezers were of high quality and were sold for a reasonable price.
The plaintiff contended that the price was exhorbitant and unconscion-
able per se.
57. Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. App. 3d
800, 484 P.2d 964, 969, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 801 (1971).
58. Id., 484 P.2d at 970-71, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 803-04.
59. Branch v. White, 99 N.J. Super. 295, 239 A.2d 668 (1969).
60. Id. In Branch, the plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated against trustees of a pension
fund for breach of trust duties. Plaintiffs contended that the defendants
failed to notify them of the pension fund and their obligations to pay
monthly fee. The plaintiffs, retired, sought to share in the benefits of the
fund. The defendants maintained that the class action complaint was
insufficient as there was a lack of common interest. The court found for
the plaintiffs and held that "the mere fact that in defense of the action ...
different factual situations may arise with respect to the defenses as to
different plaintiffs, does not derogate from the fact that [they have] the
because of the California court's broad policy considerations6 '
and transcendent concern for the consumer. "Protection of un-
wary consumers from being duped," it was declared in Vasquez,
"is an utmost priority in contemporary society.
'62
Kugler provides a viable alternate means of recovery for de-
frauded consumers: the public class action. Among the strengths
of the public suit is its potential for assisting consumers who are
ignorant of their rights or unable to afford legal counsel. 63 The
attorney general's role as the "people's lawyer" is extended under
the Consumer Fraud Act and Kugler to representing consumers in
restitutionary actions; citizens with a low income will undoubt-
edly benefit most by his counsel.6 4  The Consumer Fraud Act
also strengthens the consumer's position in a dispute with a ven-
dor. Under the aegis of the state, the defrauded consumer will
receive full restitution rather than a settlement with the defend-
ant as is often the case in individual litigation.65 The consumer
class suit is an economical device for the state because the judi-
cial consideration of remedies is a part of the action to enjoin the
defendant from engaging in illegal sales practices. In addition,
the Consumer Fraud Act provides that costs for the action can be
recovered by the attorney general from the defendant. 6
community of interest ... which justifies the class action ... " Id. at 672,
673 (emphasis by the court).
61. Mr. Justice Francis included an extensive quotation from Vasquez
in his opinion. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 649-50 (1971).
Public policy considerations discussed in Vasquez include: the difficul-
ties of the low-income consumer who cannot afford legal counsel, the cal-
culated exploitation of the poor, the possible deterrent effect of the class
suit, and the benefit to legitimate business. Vasquez v. Superior Court of
San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. App. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 968-69, 94 Cal. Rptr.
796, 800 (1971).
62. Id., 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
63. See 0. KERNER et al., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COM-
MISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 274-77 (1968). Mr. Justice Francis reiterated
several times his concern for the poor and the commercially naive.
Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 647, 48, 49, 52 (1971). See also
note 2 supra.
64. See 0. KERNER et al., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COM-
MISSION ON Crnm DISORDERS 274-77 (1968). The report documents the
continuing commercial exploitation of the poor and their inability to se-
cure relief for losses in fraudulent sales transactions because of ignorance,
apathy and lack of finances to hire legal assistance.
Merchants in ghetto neighborhoods take advantage of their su-
perior knowledge of credit buying by engaging in various ex-
ploitative practices-high pressure sales-manship, bait advertising,
misrepresentation of prices, substitution of used goods for prom-
ised new ones, failure to notify consumers of legal actions against
them .... Such tactics affect a great many low income consumers.
Id. at 276.
65. In Kugler eight of the twenty-four named plaintiffs whose claims
for restitution were considered by the trial court settled out of court
with the defendant and were denied recovery. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J.
522, 79 A.2d 646.
66. N.J. STAr. ANN. § 56:8-11 (1960).
Common Law, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 357 (1970).
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Professor Arthur Leff contends that the purpose of consumer
legislation and its subsequent application should be to "change as
many nasty forms and practices as possible. '6 7 The Consumer
Fraud Act and the Kugler decision are attuned to the necessity
for immediate change in existing practices of sales fraud. The
public class action is a potentially powerful deterrent to unscrup-
ulous sellers. In addition to enjoining the offender from further
practices and fining him for past violations of the Act, the class
suit forces the defendant to forfeit all money collected from the
fraudulent contract. Instead of being able to "write off" fines
and occasional losses incurred in individual suits with consum-
ers,68 a seller guilty of violating the Consumer Fraud Act must re-
store to all defrauded buyers the money paid on the contract.
Another probable effect of the Act will be the curtailment of
fraudulent sales operations which purposely keep the amount of
money "gouged" from each consumer low in order to discourage
lawsuits as unprofitable. A class action by the attorney general
will obviate the financial considerations which deter individual
suits against these vendors. An additional advantage to state lit-
igation of consumer fraud is that a greater co-ordination of the
investigative,69 preventive,v° puntitive,7 and restorative 2 responses
to consumer fraud will be achieved. A centralized, deliberate
attack on the twin problems of prevention of sales fraud and resti-
tution for its victims will be more effective than the chaotic,
piecemeal approach which currently predominates.73
The public class action is not a panacea for consumer fraud.
The inherent difficulties in governmental agency administration,
time consuming procedures, under-staffing, bureaucratic inertia,
and the tendency for the individual complaint to be overlooked,74
will undoubtedly affect the success of the Consumer Fraud Act.
The New Jersey legislature has elevated consumer problems to a
public status, but, in reality, it will be the attorney general 75
67. Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Com-
mon Law, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 349, 357 (1970).
68. Brief for the Appellant at 39, Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522,
79 N.2d 640 (1971).
69. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-3, 8-4 (1960).
70. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-8 (1960).
71. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-8,8-10 (1960).
72. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-13 (Supp. 1967).
73. See generally, Rice passim; Leff, Unconscionability and the
Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 349 (1970).
74. See generally, Rice at 606-09; Comment, Extrajudicial Consumer
Pressure: An Effective Impediment to Unethical Business Practices, 1969
Duus L.J. 1014, 1014-15.
75. The New Jersey Legislature has created the Office of Consumer
who will decide when a private controversy will become the sub-
ject of a public class action. The class suit is not intended to re-
place existing judicial procedures, T6 but to complement them and,
it is hoped, to provide a defrauded consumer with a better oppor-
tunity for restitution.
Pennsylvania law provides a stark contrast to New Jersey's
advances on behalf of the consumer. The financial considerations
which discourage individual suits7 7 are exacerbated by the lack of
small claims courts. 78 The class suit, although a potentially ef-
fective means of recovery for consumers, has been virtually ig-
nored in Pennsylvania. 7  Buyers who have entered into a retail
installment contract s o are protected by "The Goods and Services
Installment Sales Act."8' The principal recovery of damages for a
consumer under this act is the return to the buyer of any amount
by which the contractual service charge exceeds the maximum le-
gal rate.8 2  The Pennsylvania "Unfair Trade Practices and Con-
sumer Protection Law' 8 3 authorizes the state attorney general or
a district attorney to obtain a court injunction to restrain decep-
tive sales practices.8 4 However, the consumer protection act does
not provide a means of securing restitution for a buyer's losses
in the illegal transactions.
The separate paths followed by the courts and legislatures of
Pennsylvania and New Jersey illustrate their different conceptions
of consumer rights. In Pennsylvania, restitution for a buyer is a
matter of private concern. Unless the consumer is aware of his le-
Protection through which the attorney general exercises the powers derived
from the Consumer Fraud Act. N.J. SAT. ANN. § 52:17-B-5.7 (1967).
76. For a discussion of actions and remedies for consumer fraud, see
Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts-Does the Con-
sumer Have a Private Remedy? 1968 DUKE L.J. 831.
77. See note 2 supra.
78. See Comment, Consumer Protection in Pennsylvania, 30 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 113, 121-24 (1968).
79. See, e.g., Charles v. Crestview, 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 568 (1957);
Pennsylvania Co. For Insurance v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941).
See also, Starrs at 486-87. See especially, Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp.
1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), motion to amend dismissed, 314 F. Supp. 1112
(E.D. Pa. 1970), prob. juris noted, 91 S. Ct. 1220, 28 L. Ed. 524 (1971).
It is hoped that Swarb is a harbinger of future use of the private consumer
class action in Pennsylvania.
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1201 (6) (Supp. 1966) states that a re-
tail installment is
any contract for a retail installment sale between a buyer and a
seller which provides for repayment in installments, . . . and in
which a time-price differential is computed upon and added to the
unpaid balance at the time of sale or . . . [where] the goods or
services are available at a lesser price if paid by cash....
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1101 et seq. (Supp. 1966).
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1504(a) (Supp. 1966). Under the facts
of Kugler, a plaintiff's recovery under the above statute is approximately
eight dollars.
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201 et seq. (Supp. 1968).
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-3,-4 (Supp..1968).
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gal rights and is able to afford legal assistance, compensation for
losses resulting from deceptive sales practices is not a realistic ex-
pectation. In the neighboring state of New Jersey, restitution for
defrauded consumers is a public issue and the "legislature has de-
creed that [consumers] are a class of persons to whom the courts
should give special protection."85  Vigorous administration of the
Consumer Fraud Act and the principles of Kugler v. Romain pro-
vide genuine hope of restitution for the defrauded.
BRUCE D. CLARKM
85. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640, 649 (1971).
CRIMINAL LAW-AN ACCUSED'S SIXTH AMEND-
MENT RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IS SATISFIED
WHEN HIS CODEFENDANT TAKES THE STAND TO
DENY MAKING AN OUT-OF-COURT CONFESSION
WHICH IMPLICATED BOTH DEFENDANTS
Nelson v. O'Neil, 91 S. Ct. 1723 (1971).
In the recent case of Nelson v. O'Neil,1 the United States Su-
preme Court ruled that a criminal defendant who was implicated
in his codefendant's out-of-court oral confession is not denied his
sixth amendment right of cross-examination 2 if the codefendant
testifies in court that he had never confessed. The Court rejected
O'Neil's claim that his right of confrontation was frustrated by his
codefendant's denial of authorship of the confession. O'Neil con-
tended that the in-court denial rendered any "effective" cross-ex-
amination impossible.3 The Court further said that the effect of the
oral statement, inadmissible hearsay as to the implicated defend-
ant,4 was cured of error 5 by the presence on the stand of the de-
clarant, if he denied ever making the statement. 6 The Court ruled,
1. 91 S. Ct. 1723 (1971), rev'g, O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319 (9th
Cir. 1970). Although the circuit court decision placed O'Neil's name first
and the Supreme Court reversed the names, the case will be referred to
throughout as O'Neil (the defendant's name) for the sake of clarity.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to be confronted by the witness against him ...
In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) the Supreme Court affirmed
that the right to cross-examination was included in the right to confronta-
tion and includible in the fourteenth amendment concept of due process,
therefore binding on the states. V. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397 (3d
ed. 1940):
The right to subject opposing testimony to cross-examination
is the right to have the Hearsay rule enforced; for the Hearsay
rule is the rule requiring cross-examination. See also C. McCoR-
MIcK, EVIDENCE § 19 (1954).
3. O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1970).
4. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1940); Fiswick v.
United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
5. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). See e.g., Mause, Harmless Constitutional
Error: The Implication of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519
(1969).
6. Nelson v. O'Neil, 91 S. Ct. 1723 (1971). Speaking for the Court,
Mr. Justice Stewart said:
We conclude that where a codefendant takes the stand in
his own defense, denies making an out-of-court statement impli-
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by implication, that favorable testimony given by a codefend-
ant after a denial that he never made a confession implicating the
defendant can serve as an acceptable alternative to the right of
cross-examination, despite the accused's inability to cross-examine
on details of the statement.
The facts of the O'Neil case can be briefly stated. On the even-
ing of February 8, 1965, defendant O'Neil and'defendant Runnels
forced their way at gun point into a parked car which was occupied
by the owner. After taking $8 from the occupant, the pair forced
him to drive several blocks, then ordered him from the car and
drove away. Later the same evening a police squad car answered
the call of a liquor store owner who reported a suspicious auto
cruising outside his store. The police followed the auto and there-
after observed a gun being thrown from the car. The police stopped
the auto and arrested the defendants. The car was later identified
as belonging to the robbery victim.
7
At trial the victim and the two policemen were the only wit-
nesses called by the state. The first officer related the events of
the arrest. On direct examination the second policeman told of an
oral confession made out of court by Runnels two days after the ar-
rest. The statement, as reported by the officer, credited O'Neil with
planning and organizing the entire venture.8 At their joint trial9
defendants testified that they had been together at O'Neil's home
at the time of the crime. They both said an acquaintance had
loaned them the car without informing them that he was not the
owner, and that they had found the revolver in the glove compart-
ment and threw it from the car out of fear of arrest for carry-
ing it.lo On the witness stand Runnels denied ever having made
the alleged statement confessing his guilt and implicating O'Neil.
O'Neil's counsel did not cross-examine Runnels. The trial resulted
in convictions for both defendants on charges of first degree rob-
bery, auto theft and kidnapping for the purpose of robbery."
O'Neil and Runnels were convicted by a jury instructed under
cating the defendant, and proceeds to testify favorably to the de-
fendant concerning the underlying facts, the defendant has been
denied no rights protected under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Id. at 1727. See note 22 infra.
7. Id. at 1724.
8. Id.
9. O'Neil's trial counsel moved unsuccessfully for a severance of
the defendant's from each other. Brief for defendant-respondent at 3,
Nelson v. O'Neil, 91 S. Ct. 1723 (1971).
10. O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1971).
11. Id.
the then-accepted doctrine of Delli Paoli v. United States,12 that a
jury, in determining guilt of the non-confessing party, should be
presumed capable of disregarding a codefendant's statement im-
plicating his fellow defendant, so long as the jury was so in-
structed.13 In Delli Paoli the Court felt that jurymen could sepa-
rate the two defendants in their minds and apply the confession
only to the declarant and not to the other defendant. While
O'Neil's appeal1 4 for a writ of habeas corpus was pending before
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia, the Supreme Court struck down the idealistic Delli Paoli doc-
trine in Bruton v. United States.15 Thereafter the Supreme Court
ruled that Bruton should be applied retroactively,16 and on the
strength of that decision the district court granted O'Neil's appeal
for the writ. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accepted
the state's appeal from the district court ruling, but affirmed the
district court's grant of the writ. The circuit court interpreted Bru-
ton as demanding relief for O'Neil, since the jury in his trial had
been instructed under the now inadequate Delli Paoli standard. 17
In Bruton v. United States8 the codefendant, who made an out-
of-court statement implicating his fellow defendant, refused to
take the stand for questions.' 9 Noting the confessor's failure to
take the stand, the Court stated that by choosing to remain silent
the declarant had denied Bruton his right of confrontation through
cross-examination. The Court described the confession itself as a
"witness" against Bruton.2 0 The Court held that the danger of per-
12. 352 U.S. 232 (1957). The Court ruled it "reasonably possible"
for a jury to follow "sufficiently clear" limiting instructions by the court.
The Supreme Court in Delli Paoli upheld the instruction by the trial
court to the jury. The trial court's instruction was in part as follows:
An admission by defendant after his arrest of participation in
an alleged crime may be considered as evidence by the jury
against him ... because it is, as the law describes it, an admission
against interest which a person would not ordinarily make. How-
ever, if such defendant after his arrest implicates either defendants
in such admission it is not evidence against those defendants be-
cause as to them it is nothing more than hearsay evidence.
Id. at 237.
The jury that convicted O'Neil and Runnels was instructed in part as
follows:
[T] his statement is to be received and considered by the jury only
as to the Defendant Runnels, the one who was making the state-
ment, and it is not to be considered by the jury in any manner as
against his codefendant, Defendant O'Neil.
O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1971).
13. Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
14. The appeal was based on People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407
P.2d 265 (1965), which anticipated Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968). The court in Aranda held inadmissible a confession by a non-
testifying codefendant which implicated the other defendant.
15. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
16. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
17. O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1971).
18. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
19. Id. at 124.
20. Id. at 127.
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mitting one defendant's confession to be introduced into evidence
in a joint trial, 21 and cushioning its effect on the other defend-
ant with only a weak limiting instruction was too much of a strain
on the constitutional right of cross-examination. The Court said
the judge's instructions to disregard the confession when deciding
the fate of the implicated party and to apply it only to the declarant
were insufficient, regardless of content, to cure the effect of the
hearsay statement.22 The Court concluded:
[B] ecause of the substantial risk that the jury, despite in-
structions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating
extrajudicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt,
admission of Evans' confession in this joint trial violated pe-
titioner's right of cross-examination secured by the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
23
Prolific legal commentary 24 and Conflicting appellate rulings
25
have attempted to determine the practical ramifications of the Bru-
21. The procedure for joint trials is provided for federally under
FED. R. Cram. P. 8. Two years before its decision in O'Neil v. Nelson, the
Ninth Circuit Court in Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir.
1969) cited the policy considerations favoring joint trials:
Joint trials of persons charged together with committing the
same offense or with being accessory to its commission are the
rule, rather than the exception. There is substantial public interest
in this procedure. It expedites the administration of justice, re-
duces congestion of trial dockets, conserves judicial time, lessens
the burden upon the citizens who must sacrifice both time and
money to serve upon juries, and avoids the necessity of recalling
witnesses who would be called to testify only once.
Id. at 1196.
22. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127 (1968). Mr. Justice
Stewart noted in his concurring opinion:
A basic premise of the Confrontation Clause . . . is that certain
kinds of hearsay are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so
difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such
evidence the minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever in-
structions the trial judge might give. [citations ommitted]
Id. at 138 (concurring opinion) (Emphasis in original).
23. Id. at 126.
24. See e.g., The Admission of a Codefendant's Confession After Bru-
ton v. United States: The Questions and a Proposal For Their Solution,
1970 DUKE L.J.; Despite The Use Of Limiting Instructions Admission of
Codefendant's Confession At Joint Trial Held Violative of Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause, 14 VILL. L. Rsv. 132 (1968); Singer, Admissi-
bility of Confession Of A Codefendant, 60 J. C iM. L.C. & P.S. 195
(1969).
25. For cases rejecting challenges under Bruton, see e.g., Rios-Ram-
irez v. United States, 403 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 951
(1969); United States v. Ballentine, 410 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1969); United
States v. Lipowitz, 407 F.2d 597 (3rd Cir. 1969); Lewis v. Yeager, 411
F.2d 414 (3rd Cir. 1969). For Pennsylvania cases involving Bruton, see:
Commonwealth v. Small, 434 Pa. 497, 254 A.2d 509 (1969); Commonwealth
v. Bosman, 213 Pa. 258, 247 A.2d 647 (1968).
ton decision. Until Nelson v. O'Neil, however, the Supreme
Court had not directly amplified its earlier Bruton ruling.26 The
key fact in Bruton was the failure of the confessor to take the
stand, thereby denying his codefendant, Bruton, an opportunity
to cross-examine. 27 That factor, combined with what the Court
saw as a "substantial risk" of confusing the jury,28 resulted in the
reversal of Bruton's conviction and the abandonment of the Delli
Paoli doctrine. The Delli Paoli instructions, warning the jury to
apply the confession only to the defendant who allegedly made
it,29 were recognized as ineffective to stem the percolating effect
of the statement in the jurors' minds.3 0 In Bruton, the Court
ruled that full and effective cross-examination of the codefend-
ant-declarant by the implicated party was the ideal solution.3
In order to fully appreciate the Ninth Circuit Court's interpre-
tation of Bruton in O'Neil it is necessary to understand the earlier
Supreme Court decision in Douglas v. Alabama,12 which was
heavily relied upon by the Court in the Bruton decision. 3 Douglas
v. Alabama held that mere physical presence of the declarant on the
witness stand does not satisfy the co-defendant's right of confron-
tation when the accuser relies on his fifth amendment right to re-
main silent.34  The Supreme Court reversed Douglas's murder
conviction under circumstances similar to those in O'Neil. Doug-
las's accomplice took the stand, but when asked about his signed
confession (implicating Douglas), he relied upon the fifth amend-
ment protection against self incrimination and refused to answer.
3 5
The Court held that opportunity for effective cross-examination,
as assured by the confrontation clause, had not been provided since
effective confrontation of the declarant was possible only if he
"affirmed the statement as his."3 6
26. After Bruton the Court did not deal with the specific issue of
joint trials and confession until California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970),
which discussed Bruton only by way of dictum. In Nelson v. O'Neil, the
Court quoted Green for support in its reversal of the Ninth Circuit Court:
[T] here is good reason to conclude that the Confrontation Clause
is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court statement,
so long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to
full and effective cross-examination.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
The Green dictum, however, is no help in the O'Neil case since the
very point is to determine just what constitutes full and effective cross-
examination.
27. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127 (1968).
28. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
29. The text of the Delli Paoli instructions which were found inade-
quate in Bruton v. United States is given in note 12 supra.
30. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127 (1968).
31. Id. at 126. See note 53 infra.
32. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
33. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126-28 (1968).
34. 380 U.S. 415, 416 (1965).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 419.
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The Court outlined the vices of a procedure that permitted
testimony about the contents of an incriminating out-of-court state-
ment, thus implanting its contents in the jurors' minds, without
a corresponding opportunity for the implicated defendant to cross-
examine anyone about the accuracy of the statement.3 7 The Court
excoriated the practice saying:
[P1etitioner's inability to cross-examine Lloyd [the
co-defendant declarant] as to the alleged confession plainly
denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the
Confrontation Clause .... Lloyd could not be cross-
examined on a statement imputed to him but not ad-
mitted by him. Nor was the opportunity to cross-examine
the law enforcement officers adequate to redress the denial
of the essential right secured by the Confrontation Clause
* . . since their evidence tended to show only that Lloyd
had made the confession .... 38
Relying on Douglas the Court in Bruton reasoned that the co-
defendant's absence from the witness box would not satisfy the
right of cross-examination. Thus when the O'Neil case was ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals there were two im-
portant rulings preceding it: (1) Douglas had firmly declared that
a co-defendant who took the fifth amendment on the stand was not
subject to effective cross-examination; (2) Bruton had ruled that
a co-defendant is not subject to effective cross-examination when
he refuses to testify at all, despite the presence on the stand of
a witness (a policeman) who overheard and testified to the in-
criminating confession.
O'Neil raised two contentions in his appeal to the circuit
court: (1) the trial court's limiting instructions were insufficient
to temper the effect of Runnels' statement; and (2) Runnels' phy-
sical availability for cross-examination and "favorable" testimony
at trial did not satisfy the right of confrontation.40 The circuit
court readily conceded the first issue; Delli Paoli's limiting instruc-
tions had been soundly repudiated by Bruton as an ineffective safe-
guard to the right of confrontation. A mere admonition to the jury
to ignore a party's implication of his fellow defendant was no pro-
tection at all according to the Supreme Court.41 O'Neil's second
contention, that Runnels' physical presence on the stand did not
satisfy the right of effective cross-examination, was based on two
premises: (1) that the policeman's testimony and Runnels' denial
37. Id. at 420.
38. Id. at 419.
39. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127 (1968).
40. O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1971).
41. Id.
of the statement applied only to the existence of a damaging state-
ment, not to its accuracy; and (2) that neither the policeman nor
Runnels could be questioned about important details of the oral
statement.
4 2
Cross-examination is assured under the Constitution in order to
allow scrutiny of the facts "peculiarly within" the witness' knowl-
edge.4 3 That unique knowledge, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals concluded, did not reside with the police officer who merely
repeated the statement. Likewise, meaningful analysis of the im-
plicating "confession" could not be achieved through a defend-
ant who denied making any confession. Thus the circuit court ac-
cepted O'Neil's premise that it would be impossible to scrutinize
the implicating statement for important inaccuracies or contradic-
tions. The court concluded that the policeman could only be cross-
examined on whether or not Runnels had made a statement, not
on any details damaging to O'Neil. More importantly, Runnels
could not be questioned at all about the contents of the statement,
since he denied ever making it. 44 The difficulty of dealing with
an almost ethereal witness-accusor was summed up in O'Neil's
brief before the Supreme Court:
Runnels on the stand before the jury in an open court,
is not the accusor, and for O'Neil to examine him is not
to cross-examine his accusor. O'Neil's accusor-if there
be one-is Runnels under custodial interrogation, forever
removed from the possibility of cross-examination, forever
cloaked in the impenetrable mantle of the police officer's
testimony as to what was said and not said at that secret
time.
45
Nevertheless, the statement implicating O'Neil had been heard by
the jury during the policeman's testimony. Since cautionary in-
42. The possibility of error in repeating oral statements is greater
than in repeating written or recorded statements, increasing the need for
their close examination. See C. McCoRmIcx, EVmENCE 225 n.2, 238 (1954);
See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 150-51, 153 (1945).
43. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1368, at 33-34 (3d ed. 1940); BuscH,
LAw AND TAcTics IN JURY TRIALS, § 285 at 460 (1949).
44. O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1971). In his brief be-
fore the Supreme Court, O'Neil focused on his major complaints with his
opportunity to question Runnels:
[It] . . . is extremely difficult, at best, when Runnels is resistant
to any suggestion that he might have said anything at all to his
interrogators. More critically, it is quite impossible to probe the
reported statement for damaging omissions, errors or inconsist-
encies when its alleged maker will not admit having made it.
The fact that O'Neil could not cross-examine Runnels on the
alleged statement is seen even more vividly when one considers
the total lack of connection between the probative value of the re-
ported accusation and the probative value of Runnels' denial that
he made the accusations. The jury can and will readily discount
the defendant Runnels' denial that he made the statement that
incriminates himself as well as O'Neil, yet at the same time the
jury can and will credit what he reportedly said in that state-
ment about O'Neil.
Brief for defendant-respondent at 16-17, Nelson v. O'Neil, 91 S. Ct. 1723
(1971).
45. Id. at 19.
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structions were no longer effective after the reversal of Delli Paoli,
the circuit court saw only one avenue: affirming the granting of the
writ of habeas corpus.
40
The circuit court declared that the Supreme Court's decision
in Bruton v. United States clearly demanding granted the writ.
The court viewed O'Neil's case as the "exact situation" found in
Bruton, despite the fact that in Bruton the declarant never took
the stand while in O'Neil the declarant took the stand but denied
making the statement.4 7 The court ruled that any distinction be-
tween the two situations was rectified by the Supreme Court's
reliance on Douglas v. Alabama in the Bruton decision. In Douglas
the witness had taken the stand, but refused to testify.4 8 The
circuit court focused on the language of the Douglas case as quoted
in Bruton, and concluded that the codefendant's affirmance of
the statement while on the stand was the crucial requirement needed
to satisfy the right of confrontation.40
The Ninth Circuit Court found no meaningful distinction be-
tween the co-defendant's (1) refusal to testify in Douglas, (2) fail-
ure to take the stand in Bruton, and (3) denial of authorship in
O'Neil. 0 The court cited Runnels' failure to affirm the statement
as his own, while the statement implicating O'Neil "remained on
the record." 51 The effect of such testimony, the court reasoned, was
in clear violation of the Bruton holding, and as such violative of
the right of confrontation.5 2 The court concluded:
46. O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1971).
47. Id. at 320.
48. See text accompanying notes 32-39 supra.
49. O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1971). The court
noted the distinctions between its fact situation and that in Bruton, saying:
It is true that in O'Neil's case Runnels did take the stand and
was thus available for cross-examination; but he did not "affirm
the statement as his"; he flatly denied making it. Under these
circumstances, while the statement was admissible against Run-
nels, both as an admission or confession and for impeachment, it
never became admissible against O'Neil. Yet it remained in the
record, and Bruton tells us that the court's instruction to the jury




52. Id. In Cook v. Sigler, 299 F. Supp. 1338 (Neb. 1969) the Ne-
braska District Court squarely rejected the idea that effective cross-exami-
nation can be secured from a codefendant who denies ever making an
out-of-court statement. The court also noted the effect of pitting the co-
defendant's on-stand denial against the police version of the confession:
[I]t has been suggested . . . that . . .denial of ever having made
the statements satisfies the need for cross-examination in this
case. But this is hardly the case, for it places the word of Perez
[the alleged confessor] against the word of the detective as to
The damage done by the out-of-court statement was
just what it would have been had Runnels refused to take
the stand at all.53
California appealed the Ninth Circuit Court's decision in favor
of O'Neil to the United States Supreme Court. The issues raised
by O'Neil before the Ninth Circuit were crystalized on the appeal
to the Supreme Court. O'Neil alleged that: (1) the testimonyof
an accused felon in this case was unreliable,54 and therefore of lit-
tle positive value in interpreting the out-of-court statement or
in aiding O'Neil; (2) a built-in predilection exists in jurors' minds
to believe a law enforcement officer over an accused felon; 55 and
(3) given the willingness of jurors to believe the law enforce-
ment officer, Runnels' "favorable" testimony was of no value
whatever and therefore an inadequate substitute for full and ef-
fective cross-examination.56 The above problems were exacer-
bated, O'Neil felt, since it was impossible for his lawyer to scruti-
nize the details of Runnels' out-of-court statement on cross-ex-
amination. The central defect in his trial, O'Neil contended, was
that given the above, all the "favorable" testimony would be worth-
less if the jury chose not to believe Runnels' denial of the state-
ment. The jury would then presumably believe the statement im-
plicating O'Neil had indeed been made by Runnels. Since the
whether the statement was made, while the hearsay statement is
still before the jury; and it would be "unmitigated fiction" in the
opinion of this court, to say that the subsequent denial by Perez
cures the damaging effect of the hearsay and adequately takes the
place of cross-examination.
Id. at 1348. See also Townsend v. Henderson, 405 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1968),
cited for support by the Ninth Circuit in O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319
(9th Cir. 1971).
53. O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1971).
In a contra interpretation of the sixth amendment, the Supreme Court
saw the Bruton decision in a completely different light:
It was clear in Bruton that the "confrontation" guaranteed by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is confrontation at trial-that
is, that the absence of the defendant at the time the codefendant
allegedly made the out-of-court statement is immaterial, so long
as the declarant can be cross-examined on the witness stand.
(Emphasis by the Court).
Nelson v. O'Neil, 91 S. Ct. 1723, 1725 (1971).
54. See 7 J. WIGMORE, EvwENCE, § 2056 (3rd ed. 1940); ARcHnOLD,
CRIMINAL PLEADING, § 1293 (37th ed. 1969); 30 AM. JuR. 2d, Evidence,
§ 1151 (1967); cases are reported in which convictions based on accomplice
testimony were reversed for undue restrictions of the accused's right to
bring out, on cross-examination, facts bearing on the credibility of the
accomplice. 3A J. 'WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 967; cf. Alford v. United States,
282 U.S. 687 (1931).
55. See notes 44 and 52, supra.
56. "The prosecutor in the instant case knew he was on safe ground
when he addressed the jury in closing argument:
When you say who is telling the truth, you are going to have
to judge between Officer Traphagen and this defendant, because
they both can't be telling you the truth about that statement,
whether there was one made or not, and you are going to have to
consider who has got the most reason to lie. ...
Defendant-respondent's brief at 19, Nelson v. O'Neil, 91 S. Ct. 1723 (1971).
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details of the "confession" were not subject to examination and
since limiting instructions were no longer adequate to protect the
implicated party, the defendant felt he had been irreparably harmed.
The Supreme Court concluded that the denial of authorship
combined with the "favorable" testimony by Runnels did indeed
achieve the same result as effective cross-examination.5 7 Confron-
tation, as assured by the Constitution, is designed to secure a
benefit for the accused. The Court found that the benefit-a fair
examination of the evidence before the jury-can result from means
other than cross-examination. A counter-viewpoint of the incrimi-
nating evidence is effectively achieved, the Court concluded, when
the declarant takes the stand to deny authorship of the statement.55
The Court dwelt almost exclusively on the advantage flowing from
Runnels' affirmative testimony. According to the Court:
Runnels' testimony respecting the alleged out-of-court
statement was more favorable to the respondent than any
that cross-examination by counsel could possibly have
produced, had Runnels "affirmed the statement as his."
It would be unrealistic in the extreme in the circumstances
here presented to hold that the respondent was denied
either the opportunity or the benefit of full and effective
cross-examination of Runnels. 59
Despite the Court's reference to "opportunity" for cross-ex-
amination, the opinion in O'Neil deals almost exclusively with the
"benefit" of cross-examination, without regard for the credibility
of Runnels' denial. The Court has stated that cross-examination is
not an absolute right60 nor an end in itself, but the means to an
57. Nelson v. O'Neil, 91 S. Ct. 1723 (1971). Mr. Justice Stewart's
majority opinion said that in effect the right of cross-examination may be
supplanted by its equivalent, favorable testimony.
Had Runnels in this case "affirmed the statement as his," the
respondent would certainly have been in far worse straits than
those in which he found himself when Runnels testified as he did.
For then counsel for the respondent could only have attempted
to show through cross-examination that Runnels had confessed to a
crime that he had not committed or, slightly more plausibly, that
those parts of the confession implicating the respondent were fab-
ricated. This would, moreover, have required abandonment of the
joint alibi defense, and the production of a new explanation for
the respondent's presence with Runnels in the white Cadillac at
the time of their arrest.
Id. at 1727.
58. Id.
The Constitution, as construed in Bruton, in other words, is vio-
lated only where the out-of-court hearsay statement is that of a
declarant who is unavailable for "full and effective" cross-exami-
nation. (Emphasis by the Court).
59. Id.
60. See e.g. Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542 (1926).
end: an opportunity to present both sides of the testimony to the
jury. Although O'Neil's counsel did not cross-examine Runnels,
the Court reasoned that O'Neil had won all that effective cross-
examination could offer. The Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit expressed in a similar case what the Supreme Court left
partly unsaid in O'Neil:
That it [the denial of the statement] came voluntarily
from Nathaniel [the confessor] instead of being wrung
from him on cross-examination shows only that cross-exam-
ination was unnecessary and not that it was unavail-
able.6 1
In O'Neil the Court reasoned that the in-court denial of the
statement by Runnels and his testimony favorable to O'Neil were
major factual differences from Bruton where the declarant had
not even taken the stand.62 Nevertheless, O'Neil plainly felt that
he had been denied the adversary clash guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. He argued that Runnels' testimony was not sufficient as an
antidote for the poison O'Neil believed had been planted in the jur-
ors' minds. The Supreme Court disagreed. There seemed to the
Court to have been no lack of testimony to counter the effect of
the out-of-court statement. In short, the Court began with one
of two possible assumptions about Runnels' denial of the alleged
out-of-court confession: (1) that it was believed by the jury and
the pair was convicted on the basis of other evidence, or (2) that it
was not believed but nevertheless constituted a sufficient substi-
tute for scrutiny of the details of the out-of-court statement heard
by the jury.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Solomon of the circuit court
had pointed out that O'Neil might not want to cross-examine Run-
nels at all and that cross-examination was not in O'Neil's best in-
terest.6 3 The dissent concluded that O'Neil knew that the jury
would not believe the alibi to which both defendants testified un-
less Runnels convinced the jury that he had not confessed at all.
Therefore, the dissent reasoned, it was essential that Runnels ap-
pear worthy of belief. A rigorous cross-examination by O'Neil
would have destroyed that credibility and with it their joint alibi .
4
If Runnels had admitted that the confession was his, the dissent
noted, the officer's testimony would have been admissible against
Runnels, and O'Neil could have cross-examined Runnels on the
confession. Likewise, had the state not introduced the confession,
and had Runnels testified as he had at the trial, that he and O'Neil
were not near the scene of the crime, then the state could have
introduced the confession to impeach Runnels' testimony. In ei-
61. Wade v. Yeager, 415 F.2d 570, 572-73 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 974 (1969).
62. Nelson v. O'Neil, 91 S. Ct. 1723, 1725 (1971).




ther instance, the dissent noted, O'Neil could have cross-examined
Runnels. The most he could have hoped for in each instance
was for Runnels to declare the confession to be false and to exon-
erate O'Neil. Runnels gave O'Neil "all that and more, '65 the dis-
sent stated. The result of the reasoning of both the dissent in the
circuit court and the majority in the Supreme Court is that if the
best effects of cross-examination are achieved, no adversary cross-
examination is necessary.
Courts and prosecutors are now faced with three cases, each
presumably good law and each dealing with different aspects of the
right of confrontation in criminal trials. Douglas v. Alabama
66
stands for the proposition that if an individual implicates the defend-
ant in a criminal trial, then takes the stand and declines to discuss
the accusatory statement, the defendant has been denied his right
of confrontation. Bruton v. United States67 drew on the Douglas
case to conclude that if the accusor implicates his fellow defendant
then fails to take the stand at all, the defendant had been denied
his right of confrontation. Bruton further embellished the ear-
lier Douglas case by saying that the denial of the right of cross-
examination cannot be cured by mere instructions to the jury to
apply the injurious statement only to the declarant. Cross-exami-
nation of the implicating party is the answer.68 In Nelson v. 0'-
Neill 9 the Court concluded that where a codefendant implicates his
fellow defendant in an out-of-court statement, then takes the
stand to deny making the statement, no right of confrontation has
been denied. Where once there was a cure for lack of cross-
examination in the form of limiting instructions by the trial court,
now there is an antidote in the form of favorable testimony, despite
the potential effect of the confession on the jury.
The United States Supreme Court has not provided a firm
working rule which can be used to determine what satisfies the
Constitutional guarantee of confrontation by its decision in O'Neil.
Instead, the Court reaffirmed the concept that juries cannot rea-
sonably be expected to distinguish between defendants when one
implicates the other and the statement is admitted in evidence.
Superimposed on that principle of inherent jury weakness, the Court
in O'Neil has added the notion that a jury can be expected to give
an implicated defendant a fair trial when the testimony regarding
65. Id.
66. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
67. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
68. Id. at 128.
69. 91 S. Ct. 1723 (1971).
the existence of an inculpating statement comes from a law en-
forcement officer and the existence of the statement is denied by
an accused felon. Additionally, the jury need not be exposed to
an examination of the details of the alleged confession in order
to render a fair verdict, so long as the jury hears a contrary view





Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 299, 282 A.2d 206 (1971)
The judicial system in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
has operated for twenty years with two conflicting precedents
governing the measure of damages for tort survival actions. Un-
der the Commonwealth's survival statutes as they have developed,
if a victim of a wrongful act institutes an action in tort, but dies
prior to a final decree, the action survives his death and his per-
sonal representative may become a party to the proceeding by
substitution.' If no action has been brought during the life of a
victim, the cause of action which the deceased would have had sur-
vives his death and can be brought on behalf of his estate by his
survivors or his personal representative.2 The problem presented
for review is whether the substituted representative, when the ac-
tion survives the victim's death, can recover the total amount which
the victim of the tortious act could have recovered had he lived.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has sanctioned two different
measures of damages in survival actions. One measure of damages
applies to suits when the action which was brought by the victim
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.601 (1950) provides for the survival
of the action as follows:
All causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, except
actions for slander or libel, shall survive the death of the plaintiff
or the defendant, or the death of one or more joint plaintiffs or
defendants.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.602 (1950) provides for substitution of the
personal representative in the following manner:
(a) Volunary substitution. The personal representative of a de-
ceased party to a pending action or proceeding may become a
party thereto by filing of record a statement of the material facts
on which the right to substitute is based.
(a) Status of personal representative; continuance. If the per-
sonal representative voluntarily becomes a party to the action ...
he shall have all the rights and liabilities of a party to the action
or proceeding .
2. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 20, § 320.603 (1950) provides for the survival
of the cause of action as follows:
An action or proceeding to enforce any right or liability which
survives a decedent may be brought by or against his personal
representative alone or with other parties as though the decedent
were alive.
prior to his death survives; the other measure of damages applies
to suits when the cause of action (brought after the victim dies)
survives. When the action is commenced by the victim prior to
his death, Pennsylvania has allowed the representative of the de-
cedent's estate to complete the action and recover as damages the
loss of the victim's expected gross earning capacity for the period
of time the victim would have lived had the tortious act not taken
his life.3 When the cause of action survives, the damages awarded
to the representative of the estate have been held to be the loss of the
victim's expected gross earning capacity reduced by the amount of
money the victim would have expended for his own personal
maintenance had he lived a normal life.4 In Incollingo v. Ewing,5
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court eliminated this substantial dif-
ference in recovery and decided that the uniform measure of dam-
ages in both types of survival actions should be measured by the
"total estimated future earning power less his [the decedent's] es-
timated cost of personal maintenance, reduced to present value."
In Incollingo the parents of a minor child brought suit for in-
juries to their daughter, allegedly caused by the wrongful admin-
istration of a drug known as Chloromycetin. 7 The suit was com-
menced during the life of the minor child, but the child died of in-
juries sustained from the drug prior to a verdict in the action. The
parents, as representatives of the estate, were substituted as plain-
tiffs after the child's death.8 The trial court awarded $200,000 to
the child's estate and $15,000 to the parents in their own right. The
trial judge had charged the jury that, since the suit was commenced
during the child's lifetime, the measure of damages should be the
loss of gross expected earnings as provided in Radobersky v. Im-
perial Volunteer Fire Dept.9
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the appellants
urged that the rule of Radobersky should be overruled and that the
court should limit the recovery in cases where the action instituted
prior to the death of the victim survives to the net loss of capacity
3. See generally, Radobersky v. Imperial Volunteer Fire Dept., 368
Pa. 235, 81 A.2d 865 (1951); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438,
184 A. 663 (1936); Lhota v. Oppenheimer & Co., 247 Pa. 280, 93 A. 476
(1915); Edwards v. Gimbel, 202 Pa. 30, 51 A. 357 (1902); McCafferty v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 193 Pa. 339, 44 A. 435 (1899); Maher v. Philadelphia
Traction Co., 181 Pa. 391, 37 A. 571 (1897); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. McClos-
key's Administrator, 23 Pa. 526 (1854).
4. Murray v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 359 Pa. 69, 74, 58 A.2d
323, 325 (1948); see also, cases cited at note 35, infra.
5. 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
6. 444 Pa. 299, 309, 282 A.2d 206, 229 (on rehearing). This note is
only concerned with the opinion rendered on rehearing.
7. Chloromycetin is a trade name for Chloramphenical, a broad
spectrum antibiotic.
8. Such a substitution is provided for by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 320.602 (1950), which is set out in note 1 supra.
9. 368 Pa. 235, 242, 81 A.2d 865, 869 (1951).
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as suggested in Murray v. Philadelphia Transportation Co.10 The
court refused to decide the issue of the disparity between the two
measures of damages, because there was no specific objection to
the jury charge and, therefore, the issue was not properly before
the court.11 The court affirmed the trial judge's charge, stating
that:
There is no question but that the charge of the court was
correct under the law as it exists, and the verdict of the
jury is not claimed to be excessive. Under these circum-
stances and on this record we again decline to reconsider
the rules of damages referred to.
1 2
In the appellants' petition for rehearing in Incollingo, the
court's attention was directed to portions of the trial record, not
included in the printed record on appeal, which showed that, in
fact, the question of the disparity in the measure of damages for
injuries resulting in death had been properly raised and preserved
at trial. The court reconsidered its previous statement and granted
rehearing on the issue of damages to resolve the conflict between
Radobersky and Murray. The validity of Radobersky had previ-
ously been challenged in Evans v. Philadelphia Transportation
Co.,"3 but the majority of the court declined to rule on the issue
involving the two measures of damages because, as in the initial ap-
peal of Incollingo, the question was not thought to have been prop-
erly raised in the court below.
14
At common law there was no right to recover damages after the
victim of the tort had died. All rights of action for the wrong
done died with the injured person.' 5 The legislature in the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania has changed the common law by stat-
ute which now permits both the survival of an action which was
initiated prior to the victim's death' 6 and the survival of the cause
of action if no action had been initiated prior to the victim's death.
17
In Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. McCloskey's Administrator,'8 the
10. 359 Pa. 69, 74, 58 A.2d 323, 325 (1948).
11. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 296, 282 A.2d 206, 224 (1971).
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440 (1965).
14. Id. at 579, 212 A.2d at 446. Chief Justice Bell and Justice Egan
were in favor of resolving the conflict in order to avoid retrial complica-
tions.
15. See Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. McCloskey's Administra-
tor, 23 Pa. 526, 530 (1854); see generally, HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 24.1 et seq. (1956).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.601 (1950); see note 1 for text of
this section.
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.603 (1950); see note 2 for text of
this section.
18. 23 Pa. 526 (1854).
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that when an administrator is
substituted for a deceased plaintiff, he can recover no more than
the original plaintiff could have recovered had he lived.19 The
award was therefore suggested by the trial judge to be the "prob-
able accumulations of a man of such age, habit, health and pursuits,
as the deceased, during what would have been his lifetime. ' '20 Based
on the jury charge, the measure of damages which could be recov-
ered when the tort action survived would be the loss of the victim's
gross expected earning capacity. It was argued in McCloskey that
to award the loss of gross earnings is to overcompensate the estate
and thus the "judgment acquires a punitive character. ' ' 21 This ar-
gument was dismissed without deciding whether or not the dam-
ages were in fact punitive.
22
In Maher v. Philadelphia Traction Co.,23 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court again held that when a representative was substi-
tuted for the deceased plaintiff, he could recover the same meas-
ure of damages which the victim would have recovered had he
lived. The Court stated the measure of damages to be as follows:
Included [in the verdict] are damages for pain and suffer-
ing up to the time of her death, and diminution of earning
power during a period of life which she would have prob-
ably lived had the accident not happened.
24
The award of the loss of gross earning capacity has been justified
by the courts on the basis that the plaintiff would have recovered
his total loss had he survived. Since the action survives, the meas-
ure of damages can not fairly be declared to be different.25 The
recovery of the loss of gross earning capacity in an action which
survives the death of the victim has continued as the law in Penn-
sylvania for over one hundred years.
26
When an action has not been initiated by the victim of the
tort prior to his death, two causes of action can be brought after
his death: one for wrongful death 27 and the other for the
19. Id. at 529.
20. Id. at 528.
21. Id.
22. Id. Although the argument was not accepted by the court and
may not have been technically correct, the estate would be overcompen-
sated by the amount of money the decedent would have expended for
his own maintenance had he lived out his natural life.
23. 181 Pa. 391, 37 A. 571 (1897).
24. Id. at 392, 37 A. at 572. It should be noted that this is the
measure of damages only if death is a result of the wrong. If the death
results from an independent cause before the actual trial, the actual death
displaces the need to speculate as to how long the plaintiff would have
lived had the tort not taken place. Littman v. Bell Telephone Co. of
Pennsylvania, 315 Pa. 370, 378, 172 A. 687, 690 (1934).
25. See Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 646, 26 A.2d 659, 661
(1942) and cases cited therein.
26. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 296, 282 A.2d 206, 224 (1971);
see also cases cited at note 3 supra.
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953). This note is not concerned
with the wrongful death action.
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cause of action which survives the death. s In Pezzulli v. D'Am-
brosia,20 an action was commenced by the personal representa-
tive of the decedent's estate to recover damages in a cause of ac-
tion which survived the victim's death. This was the first case to
reach the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concerning the measure
of damages in a suit where the cause of action survived. The trial
judge instructed the jury to reduce the amount of the damages by
the expenses the deceased would have incurred for his own personal
maintenance.3 0 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court and boldy concluded that the measure of
damages must be the same when the cause of action survives as
when the action itself survives, since both are derived from the
victim's right to recover.31 The court stated that during the in-
terval, however short, which elapsed between the injury and the
death "there accrues to him [the victim] a cause of action ...
which entitles him to recover, if he had time in which to bring suit,
the present worth of his loss of earning capacity during his life ex-
pectancy.
'32
Six years after the Pezzulli decision, in Murray v. Philadel-
phia Transportation Co.,33 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
versed its position that the measure of damages in both categories of
survival actions should be measued by the loss of the victim's
gross earning capacity. In Murray a suit was initiated by the rep-
resentative of the estate under the survival-of-cause statute. The
court stated that, in suits representing survival of the cause, the
recoverable damages should be measured by the pecuniary loss
occasioned to the decedent's estate through the negligent act
which caused his death. 4  The court further reasoned that the
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.603 (1950). See note 2 supra for
the text of this statute.
29. 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659 (1942).
30. Id. at 649, 26 A.2d at 662.
31. Id. The court questioned:
Why, therefore, should there be any different measure of damages
if, because of the severity of his [the victim's] injury and the con-
sequent onrush of death, a writ is issued, let us say, a moment af-
ter, instead of a moment before, his death occurs?
Id. at 649, 26 A.2d at 661-62.
32. Id. at 648, 26 A.2d at 661. It is submitted that it is difficult to
see why the measure of damages in either action should be the same as in
the situation where the plaintiff lives and recovers the loss of gross earn-
ings for the rest of his natural life. The recovery, if he had lived, would
include the money which he would eventually spend for his own per-
sonal maintenance and thus the long-run benefit to the estate would only
be his gross earnings minus his own personal expenses.
33. 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323 (1948).
34. Id. at 75, 58 A.2d at 326.
loss to the decedent's estate would, in fact, be the present worth of
the loss of the victim's gross earning capacity reduced by the
amount of his own personal maintenance expense.3 5 In arriving
at this conclusion, the court stated: 1
Certainly it would be giving more than compensation if
his [the decedent's] administrator now recovered a ver-
dict which included living expenses never incurred and
which could never have been properly enjoyed by him. 3
The Murray court, like the Pezzulli court, also concluded that
the measure of damages must be the same regardless of whether the
suit is filed before or after the victim's death. Having concluded
that the recovery in survival-of-cause actions was the loss of the
net earning capacity of the deceased, the court expanded its holding
to apply the same measure of damages to cases involving survival
of the action.
37
In Radobersky v. Imperial Volunteer Fire Dept.,3 s the court
rejected the broad sweep of Murray and limited the holding to
the measure of damages which could be recovered when the cause
of action survived. Radobersky treated the language in the Murray
decision which extended the net earnings measure of damages
to cases where the action survives as mere dicta.39 The Radobersky
court was faced with a situation where the action had been filed
prior to the victims' death. With the exception of Murray, there was
a long line of decisions holding that when the action survives, the
measure of damages should be the loss of gross earning capa-
city.40 In this situation the court, apparently persuaded by the
weight of the precedents, attempted to avoid the total impact of
Murray. As a result of the decision in Radobersky, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, in effect, sanctioned two substantially dif-
35. Id. at 74, 58 A.2d at 325. This measure of damages has con-
tinued to be the law in Pennsylvania in cases where the cause of action
survives. See, e.g., Haddigan v. Harkins, 441 F.2d 844, 850 (3d Cir. 1970);
Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 1964); Krakar v. Don
Swartz Trucking Inc., 323 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Kowtkov v.
Delaware and Hudson Railroad Corp., 131 F. Supp. 95, 104 (M.D. Pa. 1955);
Brodie v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 415 Pa. 296, 303, 203 A.2d 657,
660 (1964); Skoda v. West, 411 Pa. 323, 333, 191 A.2d 822, 829 (1963);
Swartz v. Smokowitz, 400 Pa. 109, 114, 161 A.2d 330, 332 (1960).
36. 359 Pa. 69, 74, 58 A.2d 323, 325 (1948). The Murray court further
justified this conclusion by drawing an analogy to the recovery under the
death act which was limited to pecuniary loss only. See, e.g., Siidekum
Adm. v. Animal Rescue League, 353 Pa. 408, 418, 45 A.2d 59, 63-64 (1943);
Vescio v. Pennsylvania Electric Co., 336 Pa. 502, 515, 9 A.2d 546, 551
(1939); Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, 530, 152 A. 549, 552 (1930) (stat-
ing generally that pecuniary loss in wrongful death actions does not in-
clude the loss of earning power of the deceased as such, and that the
pecuniary loss is not the same as in ordinary negligence actions).
37. 359 Pa. 69, 73-74, 58 A.2d 323, 325 (1948).
38. 368 Pa. 235, 81 A.2d 865 (1951).
39. Id. at 242, 81 A.2d at 868.
40. See cases cited at note 3 supra.
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ferent measures of damages which could be awarded to a dece-
dent's estate, based solely on whether the suit was commenced be-
fore or after the victim's death.
4 1
In Incollingo the court agreed with both Pezzulli and Murray,
but only to the extent that both decisions indicated that the measure
of recoverable damages should be the same in both categories of
survival actions.4 2 The court admitted that the continued co-exist-
ence of the gross earning measure of damages for survival of the
action and the net earnings measure of damages for survival of
the cause was unjustified, since both were "clearly intended to
compensate the decedent's estate for precisely the same injury, the
decedent's total disability. ' '4a The opinion of the court stated as
additional justification that "damages are to be compensatory to
the full extent of the injury sustained, but the award should be
limited to compensation and compensation alone. '4 4 In overruling
Radobersky, the court finally clarified the twenty-year conflict in
the following manner:
[I]n all survival actions, damages are properly to be meas-
ured by the decedent's pain and suffering and loss of gross
earning power from the date of injury until death, and
lost earning power less personal maintenance expense
from the time of death through decedent's estimated work-
ing life span.4 5
In conclusion, it is submitted that no one can find fault with
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Incollingo if he
accepts the position that compensation under the survival statutes
is provided only to replace that pecuniary benefit which the estate
of the deceased has lost as a result of the tort. To compensate
for the loss of the victim's net earning power is not only logical,
41. It is not unusual for the court to find expected personal mainte-
nance expense of the deceased to be as high as 35% of his expected gross
earnings. See, e.g., Furmizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981, 1014-15
(D.C. Hawaii 1965). If you assume (hypothetically) that a victim's gross
earnings would be $200,000, there could be as much as a $70,000 difference
in the verdict, depending solely on whether the suit was filed before or
after death. A fascinating example of the inequity can be found in Free-
man v. Giacomo Costa Fu Andre, 282 F. Supp. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(where the tort victim won his race with death to the court house-by five
minutes-and thus his estate was allowed to recover the loss of gross
earnings).
42. 444 Pa. 299, 305, 282 A.2d 206, 227 (1971).
43. Id. at 307, 282 A.2d at 228.
44. Id. It is ironic that in Pennsylvania Railroad v. McCloskey's
Administrator, 23 Pa. 526 (1854) this identical argument was advanced
against the initial acceptance of the gross measure of damages. Could it
have taken 117 years for the words of the defense to finally persuade a
majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that to award the loss of
gross earnings was to overcompensate?
45. 444 Pa. 299, 309, 282 A.2d 206, 229 (1971) (emphasis added).
it is also the only true measure of the monetary loss to the estate.
When the award of the gross loss of earning capacity was first
initiated in McCloskey, the trial judge appeared to be willing to
adopt a more precise measure of damages if one could be found.
In the jury charge the judge stated:
I think this [the gross loss of earning capacity] would be a
fair measure of damages in this case; but if the jury can
find a better rule than the one suggested, they are at liberty
to adopt it.
46
One can only criticize the court in Incollingo for having taken far
too long to "find a better rule."
D. RICHARD FUNK
46. 23 Pa. 526, 528 (1854) (emphasis added).
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION-RIVERS AND
HARBORS ACT OF 1899-ANY INDUSTRIAL
DISCHARGE INTO A NAVIGABLE WATER
WITHOUT A PERMIT IS PROHIBITED
United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 329 F.
Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
In United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.,"
the United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania held a chemical processing corporation liable for its dis-
charge of industrial effluents into a navigable water under the pro-
visions of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.2 The court found
that the proscriptions of the Act applied not only to industrial
discharge which would have a tendency to affect navigation, but
also to the discharge of industrial pollutants.3 In addition, the
court held that the defendant's compliance with state and fed-
eral water quality standards was no defense to a prosecution for
violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act.
4
Known as the Refuse Act, Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899 provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit,
or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged or
deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other
floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manu-
facturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse
matter of any kind or description whatever other than
that flowing from streets and sewers and passing there-
from in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the
United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water
from which the same shall float or be washed into such
navigable waters.5
A permit proviso is found in the final portion of the one para-
graph section:
1. 329 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as
P.I.C.C.O.].
2. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 §§ 13, 16, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 407, 411 (1964).
3. See United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 329
F. Supp. 1118, 1120 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
4. Yd. at 1124.
5. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 §§ 13, 16, 33 U.S.C.
§ 407 (1964) (emphasis supplied).
And provided further, that the Secretary of the Army,
whenever in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers an-
chorage and navigation will not be injured thereby, may
permit the deposit of any material above mentioned in
navigable waters, within limits to be defined and under
conditions to be prescribed by him, provided application is
made to him prior to depositing such material; and when-
ever any permit is so granted the conditions thereof shall
be strictly complied with, and any violation thereof shall
be unlawful.6
Section 16 provides the penalty for wrongful deposit of refuse:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate,
or that shall knowingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a
violation of the provisions of sections 407, 408, and 409 of
this title shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on convic-
thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500
nor less than $500, or by imprisonment (in the case of a
natural person) for not less than thirty days nor more
than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court, one-half of said fine to be paid
to the person or persons giving information which shall
lead to conviction.
7
On April 6, 1971 the United States Attorney in Pittsburgh
filed an information alleging that on August 7 and 19, 1970, the de-
fendant corporation did unlawfully discharge and deposit from its
manufacturing establishment into the Monongahela River, a naviga-
ble water of the United States, certain refuse matter in violation of
the Refuse Act of 1899. These charges were the result of infor-
mation provided to the United States Attorney's Office by two uni-
versity instructors.8  Four violations were alleged. Two charges
dealt with the effluent from a specified concrete pipe, and the
other two charges were for effluent from an iron pipe.9 The sim-
plicity of the information1 o was purposeful; its omissions indicate
more about the prosecution's theory of the case than its text does.'1
There is no allegation of the quantity of the substance dis-
charged; 12 nor is there a specification of harm done to the river.' 3
6. Id. (emphasis supplied).
7. Id. § 411.
8. See Record, United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical
Corp., 329 F. Supp. 1118, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1971). David G. Nixon and Dr.
John Zavodni of Pennsylvania State University's McKeesport campus col-
lected the samples from a canoe. Michael Watts, Director of the Alle-
gheny County Bureau of Tests did the chemical analysis. Records of the
samples and photographs were kept meticulously; there was no dispute in
the trial as to sample or photograph admissibility.
9. United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 329 F.
Supp. 1118, 1120 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
10. See, e.g., FED. R. CriM. P. 7 (c).
11. See notes 12-15 infra for evidence other courts have considered
in cases under similar informations.
12. But cf. United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co. of Puerto Rico,
375 F.2d 621, 622 (3d Cir. 1967) (heavy spillage); United States v. Ballard
Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369, 370 (2d Cir. 1952) (6700 barrels of oil).
13. But cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 226 (1966)
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There is no indication that the prosecution was undertaken at the
insistence of the Secretary of the Army 14 nor is there an allega-
tion of the defendant's scienter.' 5 The prosecution's information
was plainly aimed at the prohibition of any industrial discharge
in any quantity into a navigable water.
The parties in P.IC.C.O. stipulated that the company was the
owner of the chemical plant on the bank of the river and that it
also owned the pipes from which the samples were taken.
1 6 They
further stipulated that one of the pipes, the iron one, served only
defendant's plant while the concrete pipe, served a residential area
of six or eight houses in addition to defendant's plant.17 It was
uncontroverted that defendant had not applied for and did not
have a permit prior to the discharge."'
Four distinct issues of law were raised which require extended
analysis. The prosecution, by not alleging that defendant's dis-
charge had a tendency to affect navigation, raised the first issue:
whether defendant's effluent was within the purview of the statu-
tory prohibition. 19 The defendant raised the second issue by his
contention that the clause of the Refuse Act excluding "that
[refuse] flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom
in a liquid state"20 exempted the discharges of August 7 and 19,
1970, from the Act's interdiction. The court considered the de-
fendant's subsequent arguments under a third issue: whether the
Corps of Engineers' admitted failure to establish permit procedures
under the Refuse Act had the effect of estopping prosecution
thereunder. 2' Defendant's argument that the Refuse Act of 1899
(court notes the deleterious effect on waterways); United States v. Armco
Steel Corp. (No. CA 70-H-1335) (S.D. Texas 1971) [3 E.R.C. 1067, 1070]
(court notes the actual fish kill); United States v. Vulcan Materials Co.,
320 F. Supp. 1378, 1380 (D.N.J. 1970) (court notes the highly injurious
effects upon ships and docks as well as on the fish and animal life).
14. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp.
354, 360 (N.D. Ind. 1970); United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F.
Supp. 912, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969); cf. United States v. Indiana Harbor Belt
Ry. Co., 314 F. Supp. 691, 692 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
15. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp.
354, 356 (N.D. Ind. 1970); United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F.
Supp. 912, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1969); cf. President Coolidge, 101 F.2d 638 (9th
Cir. 1939); Scow #36, 144 F. 932 (1st Cir. 1906).
16. 329 F. Supp. 1118, 1120 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
20. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
21. United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 329 F.
Supp. 1118, 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
ought to be accommodated to the more recently enacted state
and federal water quality acts raised the fourth issue.
2 2
The court held against the defendant on each issue and denied
the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal prior to verdict.
2
The jury found the defendant guilty of each offense charged.
24
The court later sentenced defendant to pay the maximum allow-
able fine under each count.
25
The P.I.C.C.O. court held that the Refuse Act is "clearly" an
anti-pollution statute.26 It cited United States v. Esso Stand-
ard Oil Co. of Puerto Rico27 as foreclosing that issue for the purposes
of the P.I.C.C.O. decision. The court noted Guthrie v. Alabama
By-Products Co.28 as some authority to the contrary. Like the
Guthrie court, other courts which have limited the Refuse Act to a
navigation statute have used the rationale stated by Justice Har-
lan in his dissent in United States v. Standard Oil Co. 29 Mr.
Justice Harlan reasoned that the statutory history and the legis-
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1124.
24. Record, at 402, United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical
Corp., 329 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
25. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
26. 329 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
27. 375 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1967).
28. 328 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. Ala. 1971). The main issue in the Guth-
rie decision was the determination of whether the court had jurisdiction
in the case. Plaintiffs contended that there was a federal question raised
under the Refuse Act of 1899. Conceding that the act does not provide a
civil remedy, they relied on the principle that a civil remedy for violation
of a penal statute may be implied in favor of persons in the class for whose
special benefit the statute was enacted. Conceding that principle as
sound, the court rejected its applicability stating:
§ 407 was not enacted for the purpose or with the effect of
creating a federal course of action to protect riparian landowners
from the kinds of water pollution that have traditionally been
dealt with under the law of nuisance.
Id. at 1145. The court continued in its review of the administrative his-
tory and legislative intent in the Act and concluded:
Section 407, like the other sections of the Rivers and Harbors
Act, was enacted for the purpose of protecting navigation and
anchorage and not as a general pollution control statute or to cre-
ate a private right unrelated to navigation or anchorage.
Id. at 1146.
29. 384 U.S. 224 (1966). In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued:
The purpose of § 13 was essentially to eliminate obstructions
to navigation and interference with public works projects. This
1899 enactment, like the two preexisting statutes which it was in-
tended to codify, was a minor section attached to a major appro-
priation act. . . . These statutes were rendered necessary primar-
ily because navigable rivers which Congress was appropriating
funds to improve, were being obstructed by depositing of waste
materials by factories and ships. . . . [T]he relevant inquiry is
not the admittedly important concerns of pollution control, but
Congress' purpose in enacting this anti-obstruction Act, and that
appears quite plainly to be a desire to halt through the imposition
of criminal penalties the depositing of obstructing refuse matter
in rivers and harbors.




lative intent30 behind the Refuse Act limited its prohibition to
only that refuse which had a tendency to obstruct navigation.
This reasoning has been the backbone of later argument on this
issue and has had some success in civil actions.
3 '
Courts involved in criminal prosecutions under the Refuse Act
have not been inclined to read the Act with Justice Harlan's limi-
tations in mind but have tended to construe the Act literally,3 2
without ambiguity,3 3 perhaps because of Justice Douglas' obser-
vation in Standard Oil that the mood of the nation "reflects a
greater concern than ever over pollution. '3 4  In La Merced,3
the Ninth Circuit Court commented: "It is difficult to see how
the statute could be plainer, for the meaning is clear under a lit-
eral reading of the statute."3 6  In United States v. Ballard Oil
Co.,37 the Second Circuit Court found that within the one para-
graph Refuse Act there were two separate though kindred of-
fenses, and that it was reasonable to read the first clause as not
bound by the reference to navigation in the second.38 The Third
Circuit Court found that its construction of the Act in United States
v. Esso Standard Oil Co. of Puerto Rico3 9 was supported by the
Ballard decision and that the first paragraph of the Act proscribed
indirect discharge of oil into navigable water.40  The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana continued the
trend of literal construction and applied the rationale of Esso
Standard to proscribe steel mill discharge:
[T]he fact remains that the part of the statute under
which the defendant is charged says nothing about effects
on navigation, and the vast majority of courts faced with
the question have ruled that no such limitation exists. 41
30. See 29 Stat. 234 (Congress directs a compilation of existing law);
H.R. Doc. No. 293, 54th Cong., 2d Sect. (report to Congress by Sec. of War);
32 CONG. REc., Pt. 3, 2923 (Statement of House conferees: "no essential
changes to existing law"); 32 CONG. REC. 2296-2298 (Senate discussion).
31. See Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D.
Ala. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze Tannery Inc.,
329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); cf. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); Lavagnino v. Porto-Mix Concrete, Inc., 360 F.
Supp. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Maplewood Poultry (D.C. Me. 1971)
[2 E.R.C. 1646, 1647].
33. See La Merced, 84 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1936).
34. 384 U.S. 224, 225 (1966).
35. 84 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1936).
36. Id. at 446.
37. 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952).
38. Id. at 370.
39. 375 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1967).
40. Id. at 623.
41. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354, 357
(N.D. Ind. 1970).
Based on the strong precedent of liberal construction established
by this trend of cases, the P.I.C.C.O. court favored the prosecu-
tion's argument that the Act prohibited any type of industrial dis-
charge, solid or liquid. The court in its decision made it clear that
the Refuse Act is an anti-pollution statute.
42
The defendant raised the second issue, contending that the
discharged substances were in a liquid state and fit properly into
the exception clause of the statute.43  Defendant argued that be-
cause it came from subterranean pipes, properly described as
sewers, the effluent was "sewage" under Justice Douglas' defini-
tion set forth in United States v. Republic Steel Corp."4 Although
the P.I.C.C.O. court conceded that defendant's definition of "sew-
er" was accurate, they did not agree to construe so narrowly Jus-
tice Douglas' language in Republic Steel.45 The P.I.C.C.O. court
held that the statute's language distinguished the excepted refuse
not on the basis of the conduit from which it emerged, but on the
nature of the refuse matter itself.46  In United States v. Vulcan
Materials Co.,47 the United States District Court for New Jersey
held that the organic connotation of the word sewage was impor-
tant to its construction of the excepted refuse.48 The P.I.C.C.O.
court's charge to the jury in language similar to that of Republic
Steel effectively undermined defendant's contentions.
49
42. 329 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
43. See note 5 supra ("that [refuse] flowing from the streets and
sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state. .. ")
44. 362 U.S. 482, 490 (1960) (Justice Douglas' extensive discussion
of the meaning of refuse included the reflection that: "Refuse flowing
from 'sewers' in a 'liquid state' means to us 'sewage.' ")
45. Accord, United States v. Armco Steel Corp. (S.D. Texas 1971)
[3 E.R.C. 1067, 1069]; United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F.
Supp. 354, 357 (N.D. Ind. 1970). See United States v. Vulcan Materials
Co., 320 F. Supp. 1378, 1379 (D.N.J. 1970).
46. United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 329 F.
Supp. 1118, 1121 (W.D. Pa. 1971). In United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960), Justice Douglas' remarks on the construction of
the exception clause give weight to the P.I.C.C.O. distinction:
The materials carried here are "industrial solids,".... The
particles creating the present obstruction were in suspension, not
in solution. Articles in suspension, such as organic matter in sew-
age, may undergo chemical change. Others settle out. All matter
in suspension is not saved by the exception clause in § 13.
Refuse flowing from sewers in a liquid state means to us sewage.
The fact that discharges from the streets and sewers may contain
some articles in suspension that settle out and potentially impair
navigability is no reason for us to enlarge the group to include
these industrial discharges .... We read the 1899 Act charitably
in light of the purpose to be served. The philosophy in the state-
ment of Mr. Justice Holmes that "a river is more than an amenity,
it is a treasure", forbids a narrow cramped reading either of § 13
or § 10.
Id. at 490.
47. 320 F. Supp. 1378 (D.N.J. 1970).
48. Id. at 1380.
49. Record, at 370, United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical
Corp., 329 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa. 1971). The court charged:
The excepted matter is that which flows from the streets and
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The third holding of the P.I.C.C.O. court was that the defend-
ant's inability to allege application for a permit from the Secretary
of the Army rendered irrelevant his defenses based on an implied
statutory suspension and estoppel. Defendant contended that the
regulations put into effect by the Secretary of the Army on April
7, 197150 pursuant to a presidential order 51 gave industry until
July 1, 1971 to apply for permits and implicitly suspended the
enforcement of the Refuse Act until that date. The court held
that defendant's argument was contradicted by a disclaimer provi-
sion 52 in the regulations which provided that the mere filing of an
application would not bar legal enforcement of the Refuse Act in
appropriate cases. 53
Defendant further contended that the admitted failure of the
Corps of Engineers to establish permit procedures or even print
application forms until April, 197154 estopped enforcement of the
Refuse Act's prohibitions in 1970.55 The court did not accept this
sewers and passes therefrom in a liquid state. This means purely
and simply, sewage. Sewage is matter carried away in sewers.
That is, water, filth and feculent material. Generally, sewage
derives from human and domestic waste. It does not include
industrial waste or discharge, especially those containing sus-
pended solids. The mere fact that something flows in water does
not make it in a liquid state. You cannot pour industrial waste
into water and have it carried into a navigable stream and then
contend that it is excepted because it is in a liquid state. What
we are talking about is that refuse which I have just defined to
you, water, filth and feculent matter which generally comes from
human or domestic waste.
50. Administrative Procedure (Permits for Discharges or Depos-
its Into Navigable Waters) 33 C.F.R. ch. II, § 209.131 (1971).
51. Exec. Order No. 11574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1970).
52. 33 C.F.R. ch. II, § 209.131(d) (4) (1971).
53. 329 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
54. That the Corps of Engineers administratively construed the Refuse
Act as a navigation statute is evident from a reading of the only regulation
they had promulgated prior to April, 1971 mentioning 33 U.S.C. § 407.
See 33 C.F.R. § 209.200(e) (2); As to how much weight should be ac-
corded such an interpretation Justice Douglas noted: "This long-standing
administrative construction, while not conclusive of course, is entitled to
great weight even though it arose out of cases settled by consent rather
than in litigation." United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482,
490 n.5 (1960); accord, United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp.
912, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
55. To add weight to the estoppel argument, defendant introduced
testimony which tended to prove a conversation in 1949 between a
P.I.C.C.O. vice-president and a member of the Corps of Engineers to the
effect that P.I.C.C.O. had all the permits they needed. Over prosecution
objection, this evidence tended to indicate reliance. See Record, at 309,
United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 329 F. Supp.
1118 (W.D. Pa. 1971); The court countered the effect of this evidence by
charging the jury:
Also I instruct you that whatever instruction a person might
argument and held as a matter of law that the Government's neglect
in enforcing the Refuse Act did not entitle the defendant to ignore
the law. The P.I.C.C.O. court cited the provisions of the Act
which make it incumbent upon industry to obtain a permit before
discharge and which refute the implication that the Government
had a duty to solicit applications.56 The P.I.C.C.O. court consid-
ered the defendant's arguments on the effect of non-issuance of
permits as matters of statutory interpretation and found against
defendant on that basis.57
With respect to the interrelationship between local water qual-
ity standards5 8 and the Refuse Act, the P.I.C.C.O. court held that
without a permit, compliance with water quality standards was ir-
relevant to a prosecution under the Refuse Act.5 9 Defendant
contended that the conflicting policies of the earlier act should be
harmonized with and accommodated to the enforcement proce-
dures set up by Congress in the Federal Water Quality Improvement
Act.60 P.I.C.C.O. held that the Acts were not sufficiently con-
flicting to warrant accommodation. 6' The defendant contended
that the standards of the water quality acts ought to be used in the
determination of what type of discharge the statutory word "ref-
use" refers to. The court held that a disclaimer in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act6 2 successfully refuted that conten-
tion.
63
The P.I.C.C.O. court recognized that the purposes of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act and the Refuse Act are the same,
but distinguished the two acts on the basis of the differing ap-
proach which each takes to achieve that common purpose.6 4  In
get from an employee of the United States is not binding on the
United States. The United States is not bound by what any em-
ployee tells them, so whether or not any person in the Corps of
Engineers said a permit was not necessary, if he did say that,
makes absolutely no difference.
Id. at 374.
56. 329 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
57. There have been other recent cases involving the issuance of
permits under the Refuse Act but none have involved non-issuance as a
defense as P.I.C.C.O. did. See, e.g., Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v.
Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691 (Clean Streams Act 1937).
59. 329 F. Supp. 1118, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
60. Federal Water Pollution Control Act 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) as
amended, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151-75 (1970); see particularly the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1152 et seq. (1970).
61. Accord, United States v. United States Steel Corp. (N.D. Ill. 1971)
[3 E.R.C. 1057, 1059]; United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F.
Supp. 354, 357 (N.D. Ind. 1970); United States v. Interlake Steel Corp.,
297 F. Supp. 912, 916 (N.D. Ill. 1969); the court in Interlake concluded:
"In order to 'accommodate' the defendant this court would be required to
repeal an Act of Congress and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court."
62. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1174 (1970).
63. See cases cited note 61 supra.
64. 329 F. Supp. 1118, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
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United States v. Maplewood Poultry Co.,65 the United States Dis-
trict Court for Maine pointed out that in the water quality acts
the sanction is civil whereas in the Refuse Act the proscription is
criminal. The P.I.C.C.O. court cited Congress' failure to amend
the Refuse Act, while fully aware of its application to pollution con-
trol through the holding of the Supreme Court in Standard Oil"6
as evidence that the two acts were not in conflict. 67
In holding that the acts are not in conflict in P.I.C.C.O., the
court reconciled the acts through the flexible permit proviso of the
Refuse Act. The court held:
Indeed the standards under the Refuse Act are more strin-
gent. The apparent and logical purpose of the Congress
in retaining the Refuse Act is to apply its permit provisions
to obtain advance assurances of compliance with the stand-
ards of the Water Pollution Control Act. The harmony
between the two Acts therefore, if imperfect, is not improb-
able.
68
To the defendant's argument that the Refuse Act proscribes what
the water quality acts sanction, the P.I.C.C.O. court stated that if
the defendants had complied with the Refuse Act initially, such a
situation would not have developed. 69 The court held that the
permit provision was the Refuse Act's "saving grace" and made
that Act flexible enough to withstand the defendant's attack.70
The P.I.C.C.O. decision establishes harsh precedent. Although
the court made it clear that the defendant's culpable act was its
discharge without a permit, defendant's original error was an act
of omission: its failure to get a permit before its original dis-
charge. The same discharge with a permit, it may be inferred,
would have been exonerated as complying with federal and state
65. (D. Me. 1971) [2 E.R.C. 1646].
66. 384 U.S. 224, 229 (1966). Mr. Justice Douglas there interpreted
that the injury to the nation's waterways sought to be remedied by the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 was "in part" pollution.
67. United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 329 1r.
Supp. 1118, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
68. Id.; see United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp.
354, 359 (N.D. Ind. 1970) for a discussion of additional arguments raised in
this regard. Defendant there argued that the acts together create an un-
constitutional scheme of regulation, "Its demands are so conflicting, its
standards so vague, that it violates the due process requirements of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution." Id. The defendant also attacked
the court's interpretation indicating that such an interpretation deprived
defendant of riparian rights without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. These arguments, not reached in P.I.C.C.O., did not
persuade the Indiana court.
69. 329 F. Supp. 1118, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
70. Id. at 1124. See 33 C.F.R. ch. II, § 209.131 (1971).
quality standards. Until industry can secure its permits, the deci-
sion leaves both the riparian corporations and the Government
in a tenuous position. The corporation which must use river
water in its operations is under daily liability for its criminal dis-
charges until it secures a permit from the Army. The United
States Attorney, cognizant of the precedent that any discharge is
prohibited, is forced to rely for discretion on vague standards of
de minimus, and is bound in his efforts toward a general enforce-
ment by the irregularity and inconsistency fostered by the Act's
bounty provision. 1
Despite the temporary practical problems, the effect of the de-
cision is to confirm for riparian industry in Pennsylvania that the
Refuse Act is to be taken literally. The decision of the P.I.C.C.O.
court clearly proscribes any discharge which is not domestic with-
out a permit.
LAwRENCE B. ABRAMs
71. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
JURISDICTION-INDIRECT SHIPMENT
OF GOODS INTO PENNSYLVANIA
Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 326 F. Supp. 995 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
In Benn v. Linden Crane Co.' the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennslvania held that a foreign cor-
poration which shipped its product indirectly into Pennsylvania and
had reason to know its product would be resold for ultimate use in
the United States, was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of
Pennsylvania.
The plaintiff, Clifford Benn, a Pennsylvania resident, was in-
jured in Pennsylvania by an alleged malfunction of a crane, manu-
factured by the defendant, Linden Crane Company and shipped to
Pennsylvania by co-defendant, Heede International. Linden Crane
Company is a Swedish manufacturer of the crane which was sold
F.O.B. "Swedish Port" to co-defendant Heede International, which
had exclusive control over shipment of the crane to the United
States. The defendant had no contacts with Pennsylvania other
than the presence in the state of the crane it had manufactured. 2
Defendant sought to dismiss the action brought by the plaintiff and
quash service of summons and complaint 3 contending that it was
not "doing business" in Pennsylvania, and thus was not subject
to the jurisdiction of the court. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the defendant was
"doing business" in Pennsylvania and was subject to its jurisdic-
tion.
Before the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts can be as-
serted over a nonregistered foreign corporation, the corporation
must be "doing business" in Pennsylvania.4 The activities which
constitute the doing of business in Pennsylvania are defined in Sec-
tion 2101 of the Business Corporation Law of Pennsylvania, subsec-
tion C, as amended in 1968, which provides:
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction of the courts
in this Commonwealth, the doing by any corporation in
1. 326 F. Supp. 995 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
2. Id. at 996. The court stated fourteen facts which, in total, indi-
cate that the defendant had no activities in Pennsylvania.
3. Service was made in accordance with Rule 4(d) (3) and 4(d)
(7), FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2011C (Supp. 1971) [hereinafter generally
referred to as subsection C].
this Commwealth of a series of similar acts for the purpose
of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise ac-
complishing an object, or doing a single act in this Com-
monwealth for such purpose, with the intention of thereby
initiating a series of such acts, shall constitute 'doing
business.' For the purpose of this subsection, the shipping
of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through this
Commonwealth shall be considered the doing of such an act
in this Commonwealth.5
The above revision of subsection C deleted the requirement that
a foreign corporation must enter the Commonwealth to be within
the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. Prior to 1968, subsection
C read as follows:
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction of the courts
within this Commonwealth the entry of any corporation
into this Commonwealth for the doing of a series of sim-
ilar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary
benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a
single act in this Commonwealth for such purposes, with
the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts,
shall constitute 'doing business.'6
Under the old entry requirement, if a manufacturer dealt through
an independent distributor over whom it had no control 7 or the
manufacturer's employees or agents were never physically present
in the state,8 it was deemed not to be "doing business" in the Com-
monwealth. 9 Because this entry requirement was deleted by
the 1968 amendment, the court in Benn could exercise jurisdiction
over the defendant even though its crane was transported to the
state by an independent distributor. Furthermore, the new sen-
tence added to the statute in 1968 increased the court's jurisdictional
scope by extending jursidiction to any corporation shipping mer-
chandise into the Commonwealth "directly or indirectly." 10  This
provision was the principal concern of the court in Benn v. Linden
Crane Co., which was the first case to interpret the indirect ship-
ment criterion added in 1968.11
5. Id. (emphasis added). Procedural matters such as jurisdiction
are decided under the law in force at the time the action is instituted.
Killian v. Allegheny County Distributors, Inc., 409 Pa. 344, 185 A.2d 517
(1962). Because this action was commenced after 1968, the 1968 amend-
ment to subsection C was the controlling statute.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2011C (1966) (emphasis added).
7. Henderson v. New York Pressing Manufacturing Corp., 241 F.
Supp. 425 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
8. Swavely v. Vandergrift, 397 Pa. 281, 54 A.2d 779 (1959).
9. For a complete history of Pennsylvania's jurisdictional statutes,
see International Shoe and Long-Arm Jurisdiction-How About Pennsyl-
vania?, 8 DuQ. L. REv. 319 (1970).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2011C (Supp. 1971).
11. The cases decided after the 1968 amendment and prior to Benn
either did not deal with the new sentence, Lit v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
217 Pa. Super. 186, 269 A.2d 393 (1970); Nettis v. Di Lido Hotel, 215 Pa.
Super. 284, 257 A.2d 643 (1969), or dealt only with a direct shipment, Carl
v. Positive Safety Manufacturing Co., 317 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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The court reasoned that it was "clear" that the question of jur-
isdiction depended on whether the defendant had shipped its crane
directly or indirectly, into or through the Commonwealth. 2 The
court defines a "shipment of goods" as a "conscious placement"
of goods into the stream of commerce.' 3 A direct shipment takes
place when the goods are sold directly from the manufacturer to
the ultimate consumer.' 4 An indirect shipment is a shipment of
goods which passes "through any number of people in a distributive
chain before they reach the ultimate consumer."'1 5 The court held
that because the defendant shipped through a distributive chain, and
because it "had reason to know" that the crane would be resold for
ultimate use and operation in the United States, the defendant made
an indirect shipment of goods to Pennsylvania. 6 Therefore, the
defendant was subject to Pennsylvania jurisdiction.
In analyzing the factors which led to this conclusion, the court
stated three propositions relevant to the shipment provisions of
the statute. First, the court felt that from a reading of Pennsyl-
vania cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had employed a
"liberal view" in interpreting what constitutes "doing business." 17
Secondly, the court stated that the language added to subsection C
in 1968 was intended to reach the constitutional limits of due
process as announced in International Shoe Company v. State of
Washington.'8 Thirdly, the court felt that the legislature amended
subsection C in response to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's of
adoption of the concept of strict liability in tort for defective prod-
ucts.19
The court cites no authority for its first proposition that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has employed a "liberal view" in
interpreting what constitutes "doing business." Furthermore, it
has been stated that it is the federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania,
rather than the state courts, who adopt a liberal approach when
determining what constitutes "doing business. '20 The first proposi-
12. Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 326 F. Supp. 995, 997 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
13. Id. at 997. The concept of a conscious placement of goods is
discussed further in notes 40-41 and accompanying text, infra.
14. Id. at 997.
15. Id. at 997.
16. Id. at 997.
17. Id. at 997.
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See notes 21-30 and accompanying text infra.
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See note
34 infra.
20. Jurisdiction Over Nonregistered Corporations Doing Business in
Pennsylvania Confusion in Perspective, 27 U. PlTr. L. REv. 879 at 885:
Despite these recent state court holdings, the federal courts have
continued to apply quite liberal standards in determining whether
tion annunciated by the court is strictly an opinion. The only way
to judge the validity of this opinion will be to observe how the
courts in Pennsylvania react to the decision announced in Benn.
The court cites International Shoe Company v. State of Wash-
ington21 in its second proposition as announcing the limits of due
process. The following test was established in International Shoe:
[D] ue process requires only that in order to subject a de-
fendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of "fair play" and "substan-
tial justice.
'22
The due process limitation on state court jurisdictional scope was
extended in McGee v. International Life Insurance Company.23 The
United States Supreme Court in McGee sustained California's ju-
risdiction over a Texas corporation where the corporation's only
contact with California was the reissuance of an insurance policy
to a California resident through the mail, and the return, through
the mail, of the premiums on the policy.2 4  A more conservative
approach was taken by the United States Supreme Court in Hanson
v. Denckla.2 5  In Hanson2 6 the Florida Supreme Court asserted
jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee whose only contact with
Florida was corresponding by mail with the settlor who was domi-
ciled in Pennsylvania. The correspondence between the trustee and
the settlor, while the settlor was domiciled in Florida, concerned
trust administration. The United States Supreme Court held that
the trustee's contacts with Florida were not sufficient for the
Florida state courts to assert their jurisdiction over the Delaware
trustee.27 The Supreme Court stated that it is necessary that
the foreign trustee "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the ben-
efits and protections of its laws.
28
If the Hanson decision marks the limits of due process, the
court's decision in Benn would be unconstitutional because the
defendant in no way purposefully availed itself of the benefits and
protections of Pennsylvania law. However, the Hanson case has
been criticized and held to be of little value as a precedent in prod-
an unregistered foreign corporation is "doing business" in Penn-
sylvania.
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22. Id. at 317. For an extensive analysis of International Shoe and
the Supreme Court cases that follow, see Developments in the Law-State
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909 (1960).
23. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
24. Id.
25. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See Scott, Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HARv. L.
REv. 695 (1959).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 250-253.
28. Id. at 253.
Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
uct liability cases. In Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.'0 the
Supreme Court of Arizona, discussing Hanson stated:
Tortious and negligent acts are obvious examples in which
it is unrealistic to say that the actors first considered the
laws of the state in which such acts are committed. A rule
limiting jurisdiction to defendants who "purposefully"
conduct activities within the state cannot properly be ap-
plied in product liability cases in view of the fortuitous
route by which products enter any particular state.30
It has been suggested that the limits of due process are
reached where there is a single event 3 ' and the cause of action
arises out of the single event.' 2 In Benn there was a single event,
the shipment of the defendant's product into the Commonwealth
and the plaintiff's cause of action arose out of this single event.
Based on that reasoning the court's decision in Benn does not vio-
late due process.
As its third proposition, the court in Benn felt that the legisla-
ture amended section C of section 2011 of the Business Corpora-
tion Law in response to the adoption by the Pennsyvlania Supreme
Court of the concept of strict products liability.'3 The court stated:
29. 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966).
30. Id. at 735.
31. In Kourkene v. American B.B.R., Inc., 313 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1963)
the following three rules were formulated from decisions in International
Shoe, McGee, and Hanson:
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consum-
mate some transaction within the forum. It is not necessary that
defendant's agent be physically within the forum, for this act or
transaction may be by mail only. A single event will suffice if its
effects within the state are substantial enough to qualify under
Rule Three (emphasis added).
(2) The cause of action must be one which arises out of, or
results from the activities of the defendant with the forum. It is
conceivable that the actual cause of action might come to fruition
in another state, but because of the activities of defendant in the
forum state there would still be substantial minimum contacts.
(3) Having established by Rules One and Two a minimum con-
tact between the defendant and the state, the assumption of
jurisdiction based upon such contact must be consonant with the
due process tenents of "fair play" and "substantial justice."
32. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 4.25 (5) (1968):
If there are substantial contacts with the state for example a sub-
stantial and continuing business, and if the cause of action arises
out of the business done in the state, jurisdiction will be sus-
tained. If there are substantial contacts with the state, but the
cause of action does not arise out of these contacts jurisdiction
may be sustained. If there is a minimum of contacts, and the
cause of action arises out of the contacts, it will normally be fair
and reasonable to sustain jurisdiction.
Id. at 1173 (emphasis added).
33. In Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1965), the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A
It is reasonable to conclude that one of the purposes of this
legislature was to make amenable to Pennsylvania juris-
diction those foreign corporations whose products cause
damage or injury in Pennsylvania however circuitous their
distributive chain may be.3
4
The court cites no authority for this proposition; however, sup-
port for this position is found in the Pennsylvania Bar Association
Corporate Law Committee's report on their then proposed recom-
mendation to amend subsection C.35 The committee's recommen-
dation advocated the elimination of the entry requirement and
the addition of a new sentence which would confer jurisdiction over
most out-of-state corporations. 6 Arguing for the adoption of its
recommendation, the committee stated:
The amendment to Section 2011C would free our courts to
develop the Commonwealth's jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations in response to parallel development in other fields
such as conflicts of laws and product liability.37
The most recent development in the field of products liability in
Pennsylvania was the adoption of the concept of strict liability
against manufacturers of defective products. The Bar Associa-
tion committee's recommendation was made in 1967, two years
after the adoption of the concept of strict liability in 1965.38 The
imposition of strict liability must have been one of the de-
velopments in product liability law that stimulated the com-
mittee's recommendation.
Neither subsection C nor the court's definition of a shipment
of goods expressly mentions that the foreign corporation must have
reason to know that its product would ultimately be used in the
Commonwealth. However, the court uses the criterion of reason to
know in arriving at its decision. Foreseeability or reason to know
must be an essential requirement of due process when the de-
fendant does not send his goods directly into the forum state. 9
(1965), which imposes strict liability on manufacturers of defective prod-
ucts.
34. Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 326 F. Supp. 995, 998 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
35. Report on the Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
38 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 201 (1967).
36. It is obvious that the legislature concurred with the committee's
recommendation. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
37. 38 PA. B. Ass'N Q. at 208. The committee's report also mentions
as a stimulus to its recommending the amendment of subsection C, Judge
Hoffman's opinion in Cecere v. Ohringer Home Furniture Co., 208 Pa.
Super. 138, 220 A.2d 350 (1966). The court's reasoning, in Benn, that a
manufacturer's circuitous distribution should not defeat jurisdiction, is di-
rectly in line with Judge Hoffman's dictum in Cecere which states: "[T]o
allow a company to send its product into interstate commerce, yet remain
subject to suit only within its own state appears patently unfair." Id. at
149, 220 A.2d at 356.
38. See notes 33 and 35 supra.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFICTS OF LAWS, § 37, comment a,
at 158 (1969):
The state may exercise judicial jurisdiction over the defendant if
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When the court in Benn defined a shipment of goods it stressed
that there must be a conscious placement of goods into the stream
of connerce.40 Proof that the defendant consciously placed his
goods into the stream of commerce demonstrates that he had reason
to know that its product might be resold for ultimate use in Penn-
sylvania.
41
The element of foreseeability, or reason to know, is also neces-
sary to subject a foreign corporation to a state's jurisdiction where
goods are shipped directly into the state.42 In Carl v. Positive
Safety Manufacturing Co.,43 a case dealing with a direct shipment
of goods into Pennsylvania, the court approved the dictum in Judge
Hoffman's opinion in Cecere v. Ohringer Home Furniture Co.
44
which provided:
A more fruitful and proper determination of jurisdiction
might include a consideration of the party's relative ac-
cess to proof and witnesses, the relative hardship to the
parties, the foreseeability of the consequences in a foreign
state, the nature of the injury, and the nature of the cor-
poration's business activities.
4 5
Under the court's decision in Benn, the jurisdiction of Pennsylva-
nia's courts will attach whether a manufacturer ships his goods
the effects which could have been anticipated and which actually
occur are of a sort highly dangerous to persons or things. This
is so even though the defendant has no other relationship to the
state (emphasis added).
See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Ct., 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 458 P.2d 57
(1969); Dornbos v. Kroger Co., 9 Mich. App. 515, 157 N.W.2d 498 (1968);
Noche v. Floral Rental Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 555, 232 A.2d 162 (1968);
Anderson v. National Presto Industries, Inc., 135 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1965);
Roy v. North American Newspaper Alliance, Inc., 106 N.H. 92, 205 A.2d 844
(1964); Sheridan v. Cadet Chemical Corp., 25 Conn. Sup. 17, 195 A.2d 766
(1963).
40. Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 326 F. Supp. 995, 997 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
41. In response to the plaintiff's interrogatory as to whether it had
shipped cranes to its distributor for ultimate shipment into Pennsylvania
in the past five years, the defendant answered: "All purchases are made
by Heede International F.O.B. Swedish Port, which has exclusive control
over shipment to the United States." 326 F. Supp. at 997.
The plaintiff contended that the answer to this interrogatory was
sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant knew that its product
would, at some time, be shipped to Pennsylvania. The court held that
the defendant only had reason to know. The defendant's selling of its
crane to Heede International was a conscious placement of the crane into
the stream of commerce. From this conscious placement by the defendant
the court found it had reason to know its crane would be resold in Penn-
sylvania.
42. Deveny v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963).
43. 316 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
44. 208 Pa. Super. 138, 220 A.2d 350 (1966).
45. Id. at 145, 220 A.2d at 357 (emphasis added).
directly or indirectly into Pennsylvania as long as he consciously
places his goods into the stream of commerce. Proving that a cor-
poration consciously placed its goods into the stream of commerce es-
tablished foreseeability.
46
With reference to indirect shipment cases the court cites Keck-
ler v. Brookwood Country Club47 and Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd.
v. Hollingsworth49 in support of its decision. Both cases dealt
with indirect shipments of defective products.49 Also, both held
that due process was not violated where a manufacturer distributed
its product nation-wide and therefore should be able to foresee
that it would ultimately be used in the forum state.50 It is submitted
that these cases are of questionable authority for the court's de-
cision. The Duple case is clearly distinguishable on its facts from
Benn. In Duple the defendant had actual knowledge that its
product would be shipped to Hawaii. The court in Benn ruled that
the defendant, Linden Crane Company, only had reason to know its
product would be shipped to the United States. 51 Furthermore,
both the Duple and Keckler cases were decided in jurisdictions that
employ a single tortious act statute 2 while Pennsylvania, at least
until Benn, had been considered as employing a "doing business"
statute.5"
The first sentence of subsection C requires the "doing of a
series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary
benefit . . .or doing a single act ... with the intention of thereby
initiating a series of such acts."51 4 Courts interpreting this first sen-
tence prior to the 1968 amendment had refused to assert jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation where its activities in Pennsylvania
were of an isolated nature.5  In Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering
46. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
47. 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
48. 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
49. In Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club the defendant, an Indiana
corporation, sold a golf cart to an independent distributor in Indiana who
then shipped the cart to Illinois where the accident occurred. 248 F. Supp.
645 (N.D. Ill. 1965). In Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, the
defendant, an English manufacturer of bus bodies, sold its product to a
bus manufacturer in England, who transported the completed bus to Ha-
waii, where the accident occurred, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
50. 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965); 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
51. See note 41 supra.
52. Both cases were decided under the Illinois jurisdictional statute
which provides:
Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who
in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter
enumerated, thereby submits said person . . . to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from
the doing of any said acts: ...
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this state.
ILL. AxN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
53. But see notes 57-60 and accompanying text infra.
54. PA. STAT. ANw. tit. 15, § 2011C (Supp. 1971).




Co.,5 6 decided prior to the 1968 amendment, held that the statute
intended a systematic course of conduct to secure jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation.
It is submitted that the court's interpretation in Benn v. Linden
Crane Co. of the new sentence added to subsection C authorizes the
courts of Pennsylvania to assume jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration for the commission of a single tortious act.5 7 A "doing
business" jurisdictional statute requires continuous contacts with
the forum state,5 8 whereas a "single tortious act" statute requires
only the commission of a single tort by a foreign corporation
within the forum state.59 In Benn the court ignored the first sen-
tence of subsection C which requires a series of acts. The court
never mentioned or even hinted that the defendant indirectly
shipped the crane into Pennsylvania with the intention of shipping
more cranes in the future. The court held the defendant subject to
its jurisdiction because of the indirect shipment of one crane
which caused injury to the plaintiff in Pennsylvania. Thus, the de-
fendant was subject to Pennsylvania jurisdiction for the commis-
sion of a single tortious act.
Benn v. Linden Crane Company represents the broadest as-
sertion of jurisdiction ever made under Pennsylvania law. Follow-
ing the Benn decision, the courts of the Commonwealth may now
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation who has indirectly
shipped its product into Pennsylvania with reason to know that it
may ultimately be used in the State.
MORRIS LEWIS STOLTZ II
56. 246 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
57. See, International Shoe and Long-Arm Jurisdiction-How About
Pennsylvania, 8 DUQ. L. REv. 319 (1970) where the possibility of the new
sentence in subsection C authorizing jurisdiction over a defendant for a
single act is discussed.
58. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, at 109
(1971).
59. Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation,
22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). See note 44 for an example of a
single tortious act statute.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS-NEW JERSEY UPHOLDS
THE RIGHT OF A SECURED PARTY TO COLLECT A
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT UNDER UCC 9-504(2)
ALTHOUGH NOTICE PROVISIONS OF
9-504(3) WERE NOT OBSERVED
Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382,
276 A.2d 402 (1971)
Section 9-504(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that
a secured party may repossess and sell his collateral if the debtor
defaults. However, the secured party must give reasonable no-
tice of the time and place of the sale to the debtor, and every as-
pect of the disposition must be commercially reasonable.' If
the secured party sells the collateral and the proceeds of the
disposition fail to satisfy the indebtedness, the debtor is liable
to the secured party for the deficiency unless otherwise agreed.
2
On the other hand, if the disposition has occurred and the secured
party has not complied with the resale provisions of the Code, the
debtor is entitled to damages. Where the collateral is consumer
goods, the measure of damages cannot be less than 10 per cent of
the cash price plus the time-price differential or 10 per cent of the
principal amount of the debt plus the credit service charge.3 There
are situations, however, when the secured party fails to notify the
debtor before disposition of the collateral and the resale fails to
satisfy the indebtedness. In such cases, the authorities are divided
over whether to indulge the secured party's claim for his defi-
ciency.
4
In a recent decision, Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, a New
Jersey County District Court changed prior state law and condi-
tionally permitted the secured party to recover his deficiency
despite his failure to give reasonable notice of the resale to the
debtor.' In Conti, Norman Jarossy the defendant-buyer, purchased
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(3) [hereinafter also referred
to as the Code]. The creditor may be excused from dispatching notice
where the goods are: (1) perishable; (2) threaten to decline speedily in
value; or (3) are of a type customarily sold on a recognized market.
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(2).
3. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-507(1).
4. White, Representing the Low-Income Consumer in Repossessions,
Resales and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
LAW JOURNAL, 199, 220 (1971).
5. 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 403 (1971).
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a new car from Conti Causeway Ford, on August 13, 1968. The
buyer signed a retail installment security agreement which the
dealer assigned to a local bank. After the buyer defaulted on the
loan in April of 1970, the bank repossessed the car. A subsequent
resale of the car failed to satisfy the indebtedness and the bank
assigned its claim for the deficiency to the car dealer, who instituted
this action. The buyer counter-claimed for damages alleging un-
reasonable notification since notice of the resale was not actually
received by Jarossy until two days after the sale.6 The court found
that since the bank failed to comply with the notice requirement,
it was liable to the debtor for the statutory penalty. However, the
bank was allowed to prove that fair value had been obtained for
the car at the resale, and the bank was permitted to claim the
deficiency as a set-off from the statutory damages provided by sec-
tion 9-507(1) resulting in a judgment in favor of the buyer for the
balance.
7
The courts are divided on who should prevail when a creditor
presents a claim for deficiency but has failed to meet the resale
requirements of section 9-504(3).8 The pro-deficiency view,
adopted by the court in Conti, holds that the secured party who
fails to notify the debtor properly may still claim his deficiency
if he can prove that the resale obtained fair value for the collateral. 9
The anti-deficiency view, however, bars the secured party from
claiming any deficiency when he fails to give proper notice.10
Neither the Code nor its Official Comments discuss the re-
lationship between the debtor's liability for a deficiency and the
secured party's liability for damages for non-compliance with the
required default procedures." Indeed, section 9-507(1), which deals
6. Id. at 383, 276 A.2d at 403.
7. Id. at 385, 276 A.2d at 405. The statutory penalty was $872.00.
This figure was computed by adding the time-price differential of $539.89
and 10 per cent of the cash price figure of $3,321.08. The deficiency was
$258.12. Thus, the $258.12 was subtracted from the $872.00, resulting in a
judgment in favor of the debtor for the remaining $613.88.
8. White, supra note 4, at 220.
9. E.g., Weaver v. O'Mera Motor Company, 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska
1969); Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sales, Inc., 248 Ark. 236, 451 S.W.2d 199
(1970); Norton v. National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 240 Ark. 143,
398 S.W.2d 538 (1966); Mollicoat v. Volunteer Finance & Loan Co., 57
Tenn. App. 111, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966).
10. E.g., Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696
(W.D. Pa. 1963); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Swiderski, 195 A.2d 546 (Del.
Super. 1963); T.J. Braswell v. American National Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699,
161 S.E.2d 420 (1968); Frantz v. Anderson, 37 N.J. 420, 181 A.2d 499 (1962);
Bergen Auto Co. v. Mattarochio, 58 N.J. Super. 161, 155 A.2d 787 (1959).
11. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.9.4,
at 1262 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GILMOre].
with the debtor's remedies, does not mention the creditor's right to
a deficiency. In light of this omission it has been suggested that:
[S] ince Section 9-507 is a comprehensive codification of a
debtor's remedies and since that section is silent as to de-
nial of a deficiency judgment, such a denial is not a per-
missible remedy.
12
Despite the Code's substantial silence, there was pre-Code case
law available if the court had desired to use it.18 The pre-Code
case law, which developed under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
generally held that full compliance with the statutory requirements
for resale was a condition precedent to the recovery of a deficiency
by the secured party.' 4 This alternative, which has been referred
to as the majority view,15 was the law in New Jersey prior to Conti.
For example, in Franz Equipment Co. v. Anderson,10 the buyers
defaulted on a conditional sales contract for the purchase of farm
machinery. The vendor brought an action for the deficiency, and
the debtor counter-claimed for damages, challenging the adequacy
of the notice. The New Jersey Supreme Court held:
Failure to comply with the enumerated provisions of
the U.C.S.A. [Uniform Conditional Sales Act] not only
deprives the vendor of his right to seek a deficiency, but
also exposes him to the imposition of damages.'
7
The anti-deficiency view was even more dramatically announced
in an earlier New Jersey case, Bergen Auto Co. v. Mattarochio.1
8
There the secured party had failed to resell the collateral within
a reasonable time. In denying the creditor's claim for a deficiency
the court stated:
The right to bring a deficiency claim on a conditional con-
tract is statutory. Compliance with the resale provisions
of the statute is a prerequisite to maintaining such a
suit.19
In Conti the court ruled that the grounds for the departure
from this position rests with the adoption of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.20 If the adoption of the Code triggered such a change
in the case law, a natural inquiry would be to compare the corres-
ponding provisions of the Code and its predecessor, the U.C.S.A.,
12. White, supra note 4, at 220.
13. GiLMORE § 44.9.4, at 1262.
14. Id. § 44.9.4, at 1263. See also Frantz v. Anderson, 37 N.J. 420,
181 A.2d 499 (1962); Bergen Auto Co. v. Mattarochio, 58 N.J. Super. 161,
155 A.2d 787 (1959).
15. T.J. Braswell v. American National Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161
S.E.2d 420 (1968).
16. 37 N.J. 420,181 A.2d 499 (1962).
17. Id., 181 A.2d at 505.
18. 58 N.J. Super. 161, 155 A.2d 787 (1959).
19. Id., 155 A.2d at 789.




to see if the change in the law is, in fact, related to a change in the
statue. Surprisingly, the comparison reveals practically no dif-
ference in the language of the two statutes.2 1 The court asserted,
however, that the differences were to be found in the spirit and not
the letter of the provisions.
[T] he spirit of commercial reasonableness requires that the
secured party not be arbitrarily deprived of his deficiency.
22
A contrary view would be that since the corresponding pro-
visions of the two statutes are so similar, and since the draftsmen
of the Code were certainly aware of the interpretaion given by the
courts to the Sales Act, the absence of modification acted as an en-
dorsement of that interpretation.
In discussing the case law in this area the court relied on a
recent New Jersey decision, T. & W. Ice Cream Co. v. Carriage
Barn, Inc.23 In Carriage Barn, repossessed office equipment was
sold by the creditor without reasonable notice and the debtor
brought an action for damages. The court held that when the
debtor seeks damages in such circumstances the creditor must as-
sume the burden of proving that fair value was received for the
collateral.24 The case may be distinguished from Conti in that in
Carriage Barn the court "did not decide whether a deficiency judg-
21. GILMORE, § 44.9.4, at 1262. In creating a claim for a deficiency the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504 (2) provides:
If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise
agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency....
The corresponding provision of the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT §
(1922) provided:
If the proceeds of the resale are not sufficient to defray the ex-
penses thereof .. .and the balance due upon the purchase price,
the seller may recover the deficiency from the buyer, or from any-
one who has succeeded to the obligations of the buyer.
Regarding the secured party's liability for failure to comply with the re-
sale provisions, § 9-507 (1) of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE provides:
If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled
to notification .. .has a right to recover from the secured party
any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this
Part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to
recover in any event an amount not less than the credit service
charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt or the
time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash price.
Section 25 of the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT provided:
If the seller fails to comply with the [resale] provisions [of the
Act] .. .the buyer may recover from the seller his actual damages,
if any, and in no event less than one-fourth of the sum of all
payments which have been made under the contract, with interest.
22. Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 384, 276 A.2d
404 (1971).
23. 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969).
24. Id., 258 A.2d at 167.
ment could be recovered by the seller. ' 25 It is submitted that
there is nothing in Carriage Barn which predestines Conti. The
court was free to fall back on its earlier decisions under the Sales
Act, such as Franz Equipment Co. and Bergen Auto.26 However,
the court chose to break new ground. The court relied heavily
on an Arkansas case, Norton v. National Bank of Commerce.2T In
Norton a car buyer defaulted on his promissory note which had
been assigned to the bank by the dealer. The repossessed auto was
sold and the bank sued the dealer for the deficiency. The car dealer
defended on the grounds that he had not been notified of the resale.
The court agreed with this contention and then went on to enunciate
a rule which several courts, including the New Jersey court in
Conti, have followed:
Upon the issue of Norton's damages simple consid-
erations of fair play cast a burden of proof upon the bank.
It was the bank which wrongfully disposed of the car with-
out notice to the debtors. Thus it was the bank's action
which made it at least difficult, if not impossible, for Norton
to prove the extent of his loss with reasonable certainty.
A chattel such as a car may well be a thousand miles
away before the debtor learns of its sale without notice.
It would be manifestly unfair for the creditor to derive an
advantage from its own misconduct. We think the just so-
lution is to indulge the presumption in the first instance
that the collateral was worth at least the amount of the
debt, thereby shifting to the creditor the burden of proving
the amount that should reasonably have been obtained
through a sale conducted according to law.2 8
Thus, the court in Norton held that a secured party was en-
titled to his deficiency when he failed to notify the debtor of the re-
sale if he could prove that the resale obtained fair value for
the collateral.
It has been argued that the burden of proving that the resale
resulted in fair value may, as a practical matter, be impossible to
overcome. 29  If this is true, there would then be no difference
between the anti-deficiency rule, which simply denies the creditor's
deficiency claim for failure to follow the statutory notice require-
ments, and the pro-deficiency rule, which allows the claim for the
deficiency if the sale can be shown to have obtained fair value. How-
ever this argument is rebutted in Conti in that the court was con-
vinced that the creditor had established that fair value was ob-
tained upon resale.
25. Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 384, 276 A.2d
404 (1971).
26. See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
27. 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
28. Id., 398 S.W.2d at 542. See also Weaver v. O'Mera Motor Com-
pany, 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969); Mollicoat v. Volunteer Finance & Loan
Co., 57 Tenn. App. 111, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966).
29. White, supra note 4, at 224.
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In discussing the anti-deficiency view the court in Conti referred
to several cases but, it is submitted, failed to discuss any of them
adequately. In a Pennsylvania case, Skeels v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit,30 an automobile dealer brought an action against a finance
company which had repossessed and sold the dealer's supply of au-
tomobiles after the dealer had defaulted on a capital loan. The
court held in refusing to allow the deficiency:
[T] o permit recovery by the security holder of a loss in
disposing of collateral when no notice has been given per-
mits a continuation of the evil which the Commercial
Code sought to correct. The owner should have had an
opportunity to bid at the sale. It was the secret disposi-
tion of collateral by chattel mortgage owners and others
which was an evil which the Code sought to correct ...
A security holder who disposes of collateral without no-
tice denies to the debtor his right of redemption which is
provided him in Section 9-507. In my view, it must be held
that a security holder who sells without notice may not
look to the debtor for any loss.
31
This emphasis on the debtor's right to be at the sale in order to ex-
ercise his right of repurchase is the crucial difference between
the two points of view. The anti-deficiency view holds that the
right just to be present is so significant that its deprivation should
automatically bar the recovery of a deficiency. Recognizing this
fact, a Georgia appellate court stated:
[T]he act of the secured party, in selling the collateral
without strict compliance with the notice of sale provi-
sions, precludes the purchaser or owner from exercising
his right of redemption under Section 9-506, and for that
reason the secured party cannot recover for the defi-
ciency.
2
Although it is true that collateral resales are rarely, if ever,
witnessed by the debtor,33 the pro-deficiency view, which grants
the deficiency despite improper notice, does not imply that a right
not exercised should be ignored. On the contrary, both views
impose the penalty provided in Section 9-507(1) if the creditor fails
to give the debtor notice of resale; thus protecting the debtor's right
of redemption, and encouraging proper notification of the resale.
The essence of the conflict is whether an additional penalty, the
loss of the deficiency, should also be levied against the creditor
who does not comply with the notice provisions of Section 9-
30. 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
31. Id. at 702.
32. T.J. Braswell v. American National Bank, 117 Ga. App. 701, 161
S.E.2d 422 (1968).
33. GILMORE, § 44.2, at 1216.
504(3). It is submitted that the court in Conti is correct in de-
clining to enforce the additional penalty. This conclusion is not
based on the failure of most debtors to vigorously exercise their
right of redemption. For the few who do choose to exercise it,
the penalty provision in Section 9-507(1) is adequate to keep it
secure. Nor will the imposition of another penalty keep it more
secure. Rather, it is submitted that the emphasis on formal notice
and right of redemption is misplaced.1
4
A recent study involving the repossession and resale of auto-
mobiles in Connecticut reveals that the resale itself should be the
center of the courts' attention.a5 The study found that the initial
resale by the creditor obtained, on the average, only 51 per cent of
the original retail price of the automobile, (actually less than the
wholesale value) while a second resale of the same vehicle
shortly thereafter secured an average of 92 per cent of the
original retail price.3  The typical situation in this succession
of sales is that the creditor, generally a bank or finance com-
pany, sells the car, either privately or at public auction to a
car dealer who then sells the car off his lot.3 7 Certainly one should
expect a marked difference in the two resales, but the question per-
sists: Is this a fair procedure which allows the second dealer to
purchase the car for a price which averages below even the whole-
sale value?38 From these statistics it is apparent that the current re-
sale procedures under the Code, which need meet only the require-
ment of "commercially reasonable," lend themselves to question-
able deficiency judgments.3 9
34. While a page of history may be worth a volume of logic,
oftimes the law finds it difficult to turn that page. In speaking to this
reluctance vis-a-vis the debtor-creditor relationship, GILMORE, at 1216 re-
marks:
We have come to feel that the essence of a security transaction is
that the secured party who elects to exercise his rights against
the collateral must account to the debtor for the latter's equity.
The principal thing is that the debtor be credited with the value
of the property against the debt. Three centuries ago, however,
when the equity courts deduced the post-default right to redeem
out of the mortgagor's pre-default equity, the analysis of the
mortgage transaction must have been quite different from our
own. To our ancestors the principal thing must have seemed to
be not so much the fair resolution of a debtor-creditor relation-
ship as it was the maintenance of stability in land tenure.
Whatever could be done to keep the land in ownership of the
mortgagor and his family was a good thing; therefore the mort-
gagee must be hindered and delayed at all points in his efforts
to become the new owner of Blackacre. We are no longer con-
cerned with stability in land tenure. We recognize that the de-
faulting debtor never does in fact cure the default and redeem
his property, so that the preservation of his right to do so merely
adds complication and expense to the secured party's attempt to
devote the collateral to payment of the debt.
35. P. Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automo-
bile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. Rav. 20 (1969).
36. Id. at 32.
37. Id. at 29.




Proper notice will not cure these disturbing statistics. After all,
of what good is proper notice if even with proper notice the col-
lateral is nonetheless resold at an outrageously low price? The re-
ply cannot be that the debtor will be at the sale to guard against
that possibility; nor can the reply be that he will litigate the
matter and demonstrate that the resale was not "commercially rea-
sonable." The truth is, as pointed out earlier, that debtors simply
do not repurchase the collateral; nor do they litigate their deficiency
notice. The overwhelming majority simply acquiese. In reality,
notice of resale is of little importance to the debtor. Thus there
is little justification for inflicting an additional penalty, the loss of
the deficiency, on the creditor when he fails to comply with a re-
quirement of such negligible significance.
It is submitted that in the light of the current procedure for dis-
position of collateral, it would be unfair to deprive the creditor
of his deficiency when he has obtained fair value for the collateral-
congratulations might be more appropriate. To emphasize the
notice requirement and the debtor's right of redemption is to
camouflage the real problem which is obtaining fair value for the
collateral upon resale.
Wi.LTAm R. Mum, JR.
TORTS-CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BIRTH OF
UNWANTED CHILD DUE TO NEGLIGENT
DISPENSING OF ORAL CONTRACEPTIVES
Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. App. 1971).
In August of 1964, while pregnant with her eighth child, Mrs.
John Troppi suffered a miscarriage. Shortly thereafter, Mr. and
Mrs. Troppi consulted their physician and decided that-in view
of the recent miscarriage, the large number of children, the ages
of their children and other basically non-medical reasons-the size
of their family should be limited. An oral contraceptive was pre-
scribed as the most desirable means of insuring that Mrs. Troppi
would bear no more children. The prescription was telephoned to
a licensed pharmacist by Mrs. Troppi's physician. Instead of filling
that prescription, Mr. Scarf negligently supplied a tranquilizer
bearing a similar brand name.' Relying on the pills as being oral
contraceptives, Mrs. Troppi resumed a normal sex life and became
pregnant in December, 1964. The following August she delivered
a normal, healthy son.
Mr. and Mrs. Troppi brought this tort action against the drug-
gist alleging four separate items of damage: (1) Mrs. Troppi's lost
wages; (2) medical and hospital expenses; (3) the pain and anxiety
of pregnancy and childbirth; and (4) the economic costs of rearing
the eighth child.2 The Wayne County Circuit Court dismissed the
complaint, declaring that any damages suffered by the Troppis
were more than offset by the benefit to them of having a healthy
childA From that order the Troppis appealed to the Michigan Court
of Appeals. That court, with no dissenting votes, reversed and re-
manded for trial.
4
The preliminary issued presented in the Troppi case-the ex-
tent to which a druggist is civilly liable for the consequences of his
negligence-is neither new nor unusual. But a more important
question underlies that basic issue and requires an affirmative
decision in order to reach the more general one: Whether or not,
1. The contraceptive was sold under the brand name Norinyl; the
tranquilizer supplied carried the homonymously similar brand name Nor-
mil. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 512 (Mich. App. 1971).
2. Id. at 513.
3. Id.
4. Presiding Judge Levin wrote the opinion of the court, joined by
Judge Bronson. Judge Gillis concurred in the result.
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and to what extent, the economic detriment involved in bearing
and raising a normal, healthy child is compensable by a monetary
judgment against a pharmacist for negligently failing to dispense
oral contraceptives. This question had never been passed on by
any appellate court. 5
The court began its consideration of the question by carefully
noting that "we go no further than to apply settled common law
principles"6 to the question of "the extent to which defendant is civ-
illy liable for the consequences of his negligence.' The court found
a clear duty on the defendant druggist under Michigan laws to
exercise a high standard of care in filling prescriptions.9 Breach
of that duty was decided without comment.' 0 Judge Levin, speak-
ing for the court, then assumed "for the purpose of appraising the
correctness of the complaint, that the defendant's negligence was
a cause in fact of Mrs. Troppi's pregnancy."" Viewing the possibil-
ity of her becoming pregnant as a foreseeable consequence of de-
fendant's negligence, the court concluded that "we therefore, could
not say that it was not a proximate cause of the birth of the child.'
12
Turning to the final element of tort liability, compensable in-
juries to Mrs. Troppi were found in loss of wages, medical and
hospital expenses and the pain and suffering accompanying child-
birth.13 A finding of liability for the principle element of Troppi's
claim-the cost of raising and eduating the unwanted child to
his majority-necessitated more lengthy consideration before impos-
ing liability.
After tracing a long nation-wide chain of sterilization cases
which uniformly deny any recovery from physicians negligently
performing therapeutic or elective sterilizations, 14 the court consid-
5. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Mich- App. 1971).
6. Id. at 513.
7. Id. Also noted was the fact that no claim attributing Mrs. Troppi's
pregnancy to defective birth control pills or misrepresentation as to their
effectiveness had been raised; and thus the question of products liability
would not be reached. Nor has extensive research revealed any case in
which that question has been presented.
8. Brown v. Marshall, 47 Misc. 576, 11 N.W. 392 (1882).





14. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934);
Bathke v. Rahn, 46 Cal. App. 2d 694, 116 P.2d 640 (1941); West v. Under-
wood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945); Milne v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418,
28 N.W.2d 530 (1937); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957);
Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
ered Custodio v. Bauer15 and followinging cases,"' which break
completely from the prior line of cases and recognize a cause of ac-
tion for such negligent sterilization. The court concluded that
"there is no valid reason why the trier of fact should not be free
to assess damages as it would in any other negligence case."'17 In
reaching this conclusion the court expressly turned away from the
Christensen v. Thornby1 8 line of negligent sterilization cases, where
denial of recovery was based on two elementary reasons: (1) the
"overriding benefit" in having a child, typified by the language of
Ball v. Mudge:'9 "As reasonable persons the jury may well have
concluded that appellants suffered no damage in the birth of a
normal, healthy child, . . . and that the cost incidental to such
birth was far outweighed by the blessing of a cherished child
.. 20 and (2) public policy, in the words of the Court in Shaheen
v. Knight:21 "[T]o allow damages for the normal birth of a
normal child is foreign to the universal public sentiment of the
people.
22
It has long been established in the law of damages that a
defendant may match the benefits to the interest of the plain-
tiff flowing from his actions against the damages suffered to the
same interest by the plaintiff, where equitable. 23 The Christensen
cases, applying this rule, concluded that the parent-plaintiff suf-
fered no damage, typically stating that "the cost incidental to such
birth was far outweighed by the blessing of a cherished child, al-
beit an unwanted one at the time of conception and birth."24 The
rationale behind such a position-other than the court's interpre-
tation of what was then public policy-is elusive. Part of the jus-
tification is undoubtedly the enjoyment and companionship inci-
dent to raising a child.2 5 Another factor apparently was the eco-
nomic benefit to the family unit of a healthy child.28 Placing these
benefits in the judicial scales led to the aforementioned conclu-
sions that the benefits accruing to the plaintiff through the
child's birth necessarily exceeded any damages caused thereby.
15. 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303 (1967). No court subse-
quent to this decision has reverted to the Christensen line of reasoning.
16. Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Jackson v.
Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. App. 1970); Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App.
2d 332, 260 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
17. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Mich. App. 1971).
18. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
19. 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
20. Id. at 250, 391 P.2d at 204.
21. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957).
22. Id. at 45.
23. McCoRIVncK DAMAGES, § 40-41 (1935); RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs,
§ 920 (1939).
24. Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 250, 391 P.2d 201, 204 (1964).
25. See, e.g., Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45-46 (C.P.
1964).
26. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
Recent Cases
DICISON LAW REVIEW
It was not until Custodio v. Bauer2 7 that an appellate court recog-
nized that the scales had shifted to a new position. Custodio's
somewhat more rational-or at least more timely28-- conclusion
was that if benefit did indeed inure to the plaintiff-parents through
birth of an unwanted child, such benefit must be offset against dam-
ages incurred by the plaintiff's financial outlay for hospitalization,
the wife's mental suffering, her inability to perform her maternal
and conjugal duties, and her loss by having to spread her care, pro-
tection and support over a larger group. 29 Such damages would
be "more than nominal.
3 0
Although concluding that the reasoning of Shaheen v. Knight
and others of the pre-Custodio line begged the question of expenses
inherent in rearing a child by their casual declaration that "[t] o al-
low damages in a suit such as this would mean that the physician
would have to pay for the fun, joy and affection which defendant
Shaheen will have in the rearing and educating of this . . . child
.",31 Custodio still refused to rule on such damages.32
The Troppi court was, however, willing to take that additional
step. In overruling the trial court's acceptance of the Shaheen rule
that application of the benefits rule prevents any recovery for the
expense of rearing an unwanted child, the court stated:
Such a rule would be equivalent to declaring that, in every
case, as a matter of law, the services and companionship of
a child have a dollar equivalent greater than the economic
cost of his support, to say nothing of the inhibitions, the
restrictions and the pain and suffering caused by preg-
nancy and the obligation to rear the child.
33
27. 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303 (1967).
28. At the time of the Christensen decision, a child may indeed
have been an economic benefit. In 1960, the court in Wycko v. Gnodtke,
361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960) recognized that accepting such a
measure of damages was accepting a "fiction, the fiction that under today's
conditions, not those of 1864, the minor child is a breadwinner. He is not.
He is an expense." Wycko v. Gnodtke, supra at 126. Custodio's recogni-
tion that a child could be an economic detriment, and that his sole benefit
was in the form of companionship, was in keeping with the modern
decisions covering the area.
29. Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303
(1967).
30. Id. at 447, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 330.
31. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. 1964).
32. Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303 (1967).
Plaintiff's child in Custodio had not yet been born. Based on this fact
and the state of the record, the court found it impossible to determine
whether plaintiffs damages would, in fact, outweigh the benefit visited
upon her by the birth of a child. There is no further judicial mention of
the case; apparently it was resolved by settlement.
33. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Mich. App. 1971).
To implement computation of this damage award, the Troppi
court suggested utilization of the "benefits rule" outlined above.
Thus, a monetary value would be placed on plaintiffs' damages,
including the cost of rearing the child;34 from this would be sub-
tracted the value rendered to plaintiffs by the companionship of the
child and whatever value the finder of fact might assign to the
largely illusory"5 financial services which plaintiffs can expect from
their child.8 6 The resulting figure would constitute the proper
amount for a compensatory damages award. Such a method of
determining damages permits sufficient flexibility to meet the var-
ied damages suffered by plaintiffs. For example, an unmarried fe-
male plaintiff could be awarded higher damages, 7 whereas a
plaintiff taking oral contraceptives as a temporary measure only,
planning shortly to begin or increase her family, could be awarded
proportionately less.8
The essential point ... is that the trier must have the power
to evaluate the benefit according to all the circumstances
of the case presented. Family size, family income, age
of the parents, and marital status are some but not all
the factors which the trier must consider .... s
The result reached by the Troppi court appears to be equitable;
but it is submitted that the court's use of the benefits rule was
misplaced. A basic error was made by the court in accepting the
rationale of the courts in the Christensen line of cases: that the
companionship-financial services value of the child should be sub-
tracted from the costs incident to bearing and rearing the child as
part of the computation of the plaintiff's damages. 40 Such a form-
ula does not legitimately follow from the benefits rule.
In the Christensen line of cases and in Troppi, the courts ap-
pear to regard the benefits rule as permitting a mitigation or off-
set of damages. The rule as set forth in the Restatement of Torts
indicates a different intent:
34. This would include plaintiff's pain and suffering, financial out-
lay for hospital and medical expenses, loss of wages, and the monetary
value of having to spread her love and affection over a larger group.
35. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
36. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Mich. App. 1971).
37. This is to meet her greater damage resulting from her greater
humiliation, sadness, and embarrassment ensuing from the illegitimate
pregnancy and birth. These elements would be usual and natural conse-
quences of such a pregnancy. Sheppard, Negligent Interference with
Birth Control Practices, 11 S. TEX. U_ . 229, 262-67 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Sheppard].
38. In effect, children born in such a situation can be characterized
as unwanted for only a certain period of time. Thus, plaintiffs would
have received a benefit from the birth, although the benefit came earlier
than desired. Damages would have to be based on the period of planned
delay, which would no longer be possible. Such damages should be de-
terminable under the benefits rule, discussed above. See Sheppard, supra
note 37, at 249-60.
39. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Mich. App. 1971).
40. See text accompanying note 24, supra.
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Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to
the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has con-
ferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the interest
which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is
considered in mitigation of damages, where this is equit-
ble.
41
The Restatement clearly indicates that damages resulting from the
invasion of one interest are not diminished by showing benefit to
another interest. Thus, to be considered in arriving at net damages,
the benefit secured-the companionship of the child-must aid the
same interest of the plaintiffs as that which was injured by the de-
fendant.42 It is submitted that there is no such direct connection
between the wife's pain and suffering, her loss of wages, or her
medical and hospital bills on the one hand, and the companionship
of the child on the other.42 Nor is there such a connection between
the child's companionship and services and the cost of rearing
him.44 The defendant's damage was to the pecuniary interest of the
plaintiffs', increasing their out-of-pocket expenses; whereas the
benefit rendered was to the plaintiffs' interest of "enjoyment"
or parenthood, which certainly cannot be classified as a financial
benefit. Plaintiffs' measure of damage, therefore, should be in-
clusive of all the items claimed, but should not be reduced by the
benefit received in the child's birth. Under such a ruling the
variance in damages between married and unmarried plaintiffs-and
like problems-could be resolved within the traditional framework
of pain and suffering, lost wages, and other damages suffered to
a greater degree by one than by the other.
4 5
Another aspect of the mitigation argument is that the parents,
in order to comply with the traditional requirement of minimizing
loss, should be forced to rid themselves of the financially detri-
mental child, or forego damages for the expense of rearing him.4"
Troppi considers and rejects this possibility of requiring the plain-
tiffs to either abort the child or place it for adoption as a means
of fulfilling their mitigation responsibility. 47 Such a requirement
41. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 970 (1939) (emphasis added). This
principle has been applied for many years. See, e.g., McGraw v. Ide Estate
Investment Co., 106 Kan. 348, 187 P. 887 (1920); Mayo v. City of Spring-
field, 138 Mass. 70 (1884); Burtram v. Clark, 103 Mich. 383, 61 N.W. 552
(1894) ; Paulson v. Sorenson, 33 N.D. 448, 157 N.W. 473 (1916).
42. Sheppard, supra note 37, at 239.
43. Magnolia Metal Co. v. Gale, 189 Mass. 124, 75 N.E. 219 (1905).
44. See Sheppard, supra note 37, at 229.
45. A like result is presently being reached in damages awards to
persons of various earning capacities. Similar valuation techniques would
be applied here.
46. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Mich. App. 1971).
47. Id. at 519-20.
"ignore[s] the very real difference which our law recognizes be-
tween the avoidance of conception and the disposition of the hu-
man organism after conception. '48 Mitigation requires only that
reasonable means be taken 49 and, according to the court, such a re-
quirement of all plaintiffs certainly would not be reasonable.
If the negligence of a tortfeasor results in conception of
a child by a woman whose emotional and mental make-up
is inconsistent with aborting or placing the child for adop-
tion, then, under the principle that the tortfeasor takes the
injured party as he finds him, the tortfeasor cannot com-
plain that the damages that will be assessed against him
are greater than those that would be determined if he had
negligently caused the conception of a child by a woman
who was willing to abort or place the child for adoption.5 0
Such a position clearly permits reduction of damages where plain-
tiff has in fact aborted or placed the child for adoption."
Underlying the entire chain of reasoning discussed above is the
Troppi court's willingness to re-examine the public policy enun-
ciated in the Christensen line of cases.52 Following the Cali-
fornia court's intimation of a radical shift in public policy in Cus-
todio,53 Troppi cites a Michigan statute permitting oral contracep-
tives to be dispensed without cost to recipients of public welfare,
with the express purpose of family planning. 4 The court declares
that:
Where the State's advocacy of family planning is so vi-
gorous as to include payments for contraceptives as part of
the welfare program, public policy cannot be said to dis-
favor contraception. 55
Additionally recognized is the fact that tens of millions of people
use contraceptives, thereby expressing the "sense of the commun-
ity."56 Placing liability on the defendant druggist acts as a deter-
rent to prevent future negligence in the dispensing of oral con-
traceptives as well as other drugs,57 a development also favored by
public policy. 58 Undoubtedly, much more time could have been de-
48. Id. at 519.
49. "Where one person has committed a tort . . . against another, it
is incumbent upon the latter to use such means as are reasonable under
the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages." McCoRmicK, DAM-
AGES, § 33; Talley v. Courter, 93 Mich. 473, 53 N.W. 621 (1892); Smith v.
Jones, 382 Mich. 176, 169 N.W.2d 308 (1969).
50. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (Mich. App. 1971).
51. Cf. Settle v. Dakis, 133 Conn. 55, 48 A.2d 271 (1964).
52. "We are of the opinion that to allow damages for the normal
birth of a normal child is foreign to the universal public sentiment of the
people." Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 45 (C.P. 1964).
53. Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303 n.15
(1967).
54. MICH. STAT. ANN. 1969 Rev. § 14.7(1); MICH. STAT. ANN. 1968
Rev. § 16.414(2).
55. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Mich. App. 1971).
56. Id.
57. PROSSER, TORTS (3d ed.), § 4; 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS, § 11.5.
58. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Mich. App. 1971).
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voted to this area of policyA9 It is significant, as indicative of a
complete shift in public policy, that the court spends so little time
in reversing the prior policy, since a general rule of policy declara-
tions by courts is that "an activity can only be declared to be
against public policy when there is a virtual unanimity of opinion
in regard to it."60 Troppi thus recognizes a complete shift in public
policy concerning the area since the Christensen line of cases.
The Troppi decision is adequate as to the precise question
covered. Certain problem areas are, however, opened by the rul-
ing. The question of products liability for failure of oral contra-
ceptives will undoubtedly gain viability following this recognition
of economic detriment inherent in an unwanted child, although the
area of causation will surely be contested on the basis of less than
100% reliability of the contraceptives and intervening cause."' Some
effect may also be felt in computing damages for the wrongful death
of a child, since under the Troppi decision the child's economic ad-
vantage to the family is minimized. The court's dicta as to the
impossibility of requiring all women to undergo abortions6 2 may
have some impact in Michigan regarding the area of legislation
requiring mandatory family limitation, although this is expressly
denied by the court.63 None of these questions, however, were
within the scope of the question presented to the court.
One unanswered question which will certainly require further
judicial delineation is the practical effect of race, age and marital
status on damages sought as they interact with the standards of liv-
ing enjoyed by various plaintiffs. Should the rich plaintiff receive
more compensation for rearing and educating his child than the
poor? It is suggested that this problem can be resolved under the
ancient tort doctrine of taking the plaintiff as you find him,6 4 but
in view of society's advocation of equality of opportunity for all, any
conclusion would be purest speculation.
The Troppi decision appears to be a positive step in an area
of the law sadly behind the times. In going beyond the Custodio
line of cases, which recognized a wrong but offered no remedy, it not
only joins the trend away from the Christensen line of cases which
refused to consider any cause of action, but carries compensation for
wrongful birth nearer to its logical conclusion. Progress of this
59. See 19 U. PrTT. L. REV. 802 (1958); 56 GEO. L.J. 976 (1968).
60. Sheppard, supra note 37, at 229.
61. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Mich. App. 1971).
62. Id. at 519.
63. Id. at 520.
64. See 22 AM. JuR. 2d 173.
sort, where the court matches its decision to the recognized tenor
of the times, is beneficial to both society and the law.
PAUL R. OBER
